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Prior to the advent of the Constitution and constitutional democracy land policies of the 
apartheid state secured resource ownership and control of land exclusively for the white 
minority, whilst dispossessing large communities of black, coloured and Asian people and 
banishing them to designated ‘’native reserves’’. Shortly before the transition to democracy 
liberation groups together with the old apartheid regime, sought to negotiate on land policies 
which not only constitutionalized property rights but which also constitutionalized a priority 
to land reform in order to redress the injustices of the past. This paper examines whether the 
law, as captured in section 25 of the Constitution, has helped or hindered government in 
unfolding a progressive programme of land reform. As a contribution to the debate 
surrounding issues on the appropriateness of the expropriation of land as a means of 
accelerating the pace of land redistribution, this minor dissertation offers a critical lens 
through which the state’s current land reform policy is evaluated against the Constitution’s 
transformative agenda of land reform. Through an analysis of constitutional jurisprudence-
including academic literature and legislation- this minor dissertation aims to investigate 
whether section 25 (by reason of a failure on the part of the state to accelerate expropriation 
for the purposes of redistribution of land), is anti-transformational. By deconstructing section 
25 (the property clause) my minor dissertation offers insight into a rebuttable presumption 
that it is in fact not the Constitution, specifically section 25, but in fact the state and its own 
current policies that are responsible for hindering the pace of transformation in regards to 
progressive land reform.  
 
KEY PHRASES: Land reform, expropriation, transformative constitutional agenda, land 
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The fall of Apartheid brought with it the adoption of a type of democracy premised on 
the supremacy of the Constitution in South Africa. The architects of the newly formed 
democracy believed that it was necessary to design, draft and put into place a Constitution 
that was capable of legitimising a system of principles and values upon which an agenda for 
transformation is possible. This agenda can be identified as transformative constitutionalism. 
Transformative constitutionalism is characterized as an agenda that seeks to reform a country 
from a past characterized by conflict, inequality and injustice, to a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, substantive justice in social, economic and political realities and 
development opportunities for all South African citizens.1 At the heart of transformative 
constitutionalism lies a commitment towards a continuous transformation of the country’s 
social, political, economic and legal culture.2 It is through the project of transformative 
constitutionalism that the possibility of a reformed, equitable system of land rights that will 
provide development opportunities for all South Africans, can and should be attained within a 
constitutional democratic state. The presence of a Bill of Rights as a corner stone of South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy, serves as an influential instrument useful for strengthening 
the commitment towards the pursuit of transformation. The Bill of Rights not only safeguard 
fundamental human rights from infringement, but also imposes positive obligations upon the 
state to progressively promote the realisation of these rights in fulfilment of achieving 
substantive equality. The agenda of transformative constitutionalism serves to guide the 
nation towards a better future, a future in which all citizens irrespective of race and class, are 
no longer precluded from partaking in the development of their well-being and social 
standing as a result of opportunities brought on by the establishment of an equitable system 
of land rights 
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND AIMS OF THE PAPER 
     This paper intends to reflect on whether the inclusion of a provision protecting existing 
property rights in section 25(1) of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
(Constitution) has helped or hindered the transformative purpose of the constitution, and 
                                                          
1 AJ Van der Walt “Dancing with Codes’’ 2001 118 South African Law Journal 258. 
2 Mashele Rapatsa ‘’ Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa’’ Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences Vol 5 at 887-888. 
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specifically, the state’s commitment to land reform in South Africa? The purpose is to 
critically reflect and ascertain whether the law, and specifically section 25 of the 
Constitution, has stood in the way of government unfolding a programme of land reform that 
is consistent with the objectives of land redistribution? Although it is undoubtedly a 
rebuttable proposition, for the purposes of this critical assessment of section 25, I propose to 
proceed on the basis of the assumption: that land reform has not happened at a pace sufficient 
to properly serve the constitution’s transformative agenda. Accordingly, I can dispense with, 
or rather avoid, any policy argument on this issue, since the objective of this paper is to 
explore and debate any constraints imposed by the constitution to a progressive land reform 
policy. Framing my (legal) inquiry in this way gives rise to a number of critical questions. 
This is essential as it will assist in ascertaining whether section 25 is the reason for the 
staggered pace at which land reform is happening, or whether section 25 is the reason that 
there is a lack of land reform at all thus leading to a vital and fundamentally over-arching 
question, namely: is the Constitution “Anti Transformational’’? 
 
1.2 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
     Chapter two begins with a summary of the meaning of South Africa’s transformative 
constitutional agenda and what implications it has for socio-economic policy issues such as 
land reform, followed by a discussion of the legislative history surrounding property rights 
preceding the advent of the Constitution in chapter three. Chapter four focuses on an outline 
of a literature review conducted critically by relevant academics, in order to determine which 
prevailing arguments support or weaken my proposition. Chapter five analyses section 25 for 
the purposes of evaluating how it may either aid or hinder progressive land reform, and 
finally chapter six critiques the legitimacy of a claim based on ‘lack of available resources’ 
raised by the state in contemplation of its fulfilment of section 25(5) in respect to progressive 
land reform. This will be evaluated alongside the jurisprudence surrounding the issue 
between the obligations imposed on the state to realize the Constitution’s transformative 










2. SOUTH AFRICA’S TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AGENDA 
WITHIN PROGRAMMES OF LAND REFORM 
 
2.1 SUMMARY OF THE MEANINING OF SOUTH AFRICA’S 
TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AGENDA 
 
From a period of injustices represented by discriminatory laws, and a biased 
parliamentary system that favoured the interests of the dominant white minority a new 
constitutional system emerged with the sole directive of establishing a new democratic order 
supported by a transformative agenda. This agenda seeks to enact just laws for all citizens 
whom the constitution suggests is entitled to equal access to resources and services at the 
state’s disposal. The Interim Constitution together with the Final Constitution comprehended 
the necessity of inextricably linking and intertwining political freedom, with socio-economic 
justice.3 My understanding of South Africa’s transformative constitutional agenda is 
informed by the Constitution’s desire to not merely proclaim the existence of new democratic 
political rights, but to commit the state (as a representative of the South African people) to 
transforming society into one in which citizens have access to social and economic resources 
which enable for the realization of their self-worth and dignity.4 Having had a glimpse at the 
Preamble, it is my understanding that the Constitution’s purpose is to promote a consistent 
process of transformation in order to establish a society based on social, as well as political 
justice and equality. In achieving equality, the Constitution outlines an overriding and ever 
present commitment towards realising substantive (redistributive) equality and justice, and 
not just formal equality and justice.5 Substantive equality and justice means a commitment to 
achieving equality in the lived, social and economic circumstances of those previously 
disadvantaged and left vulnerable by the apartheid land laws.6 
  According to Klare ‘the constitutional principles in terms of which the 1996 text was 
certified’, (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, No 200 of `993, Schedule 4), 
include the foundational assumptions that the final Constitution shall provide for a system of 
government committed to achieving equality’, and that ‘equality before the law’ contemplates 
                                                          
3 Karl Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human 
Rights at 153. 
4 Du Plessis v De Klerk, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) at para 132. 




laws, programs, and activities designed to ‘ameliorate the conditions of the previously 
disadvantaged’.7 This translates to my understanding that the Constitution commits the 
government to combating poverty and promoting social welfare, through the affirmation and 
promotion of democratic values, human rights and equality.8 This commitment is extended to 
the areas of land reform and access to land to be specific.9 In normative terms this idea of the 
transformative constitutional agenda has implications for the establishment of an overriding 
and ever-present commitment towards realising substantive (redistributive) equality for those 
previously disadvantaged by unjust apartheid land laws. This is likely to be achieved by 
establishing mechanisms that are capable of facilitating the progressive redistribution of land 
to ameliorate the social, and economic conditions of vulnerable people previously 
disadvantaged by unjust apartheid land laws. In constitutional terms this is translated into 
section 25(4) to 25(8) setting out the Constitution’s transformative agenda in relation to those 
previously dispossessed of their rights to property. The implications of this is the formulation 
of 25(5) which articulates the Constitution’s desire for the implementation of reasonable 
legislation or policies geared towards realising the constitutional right to land, in order to 
overcome the socio-economic legacy of apartheid land law.  Sections 1(a), section 7(2), 
section 25(4) -(8) and section 39(1) (a) set out strong normative frameworks that are useful 
for understanding the Constitution’s transformative agenda, and how substantive 
(redistributive) justice, particularly through land reform programmes, is to be achieved in the 
lived, social and economic circumstances of those previously dispossessed.10 
Karl Klare developed the notion of ‘transformative constitutionalism’ which defines 
the notion as ‘a transformative enterprise of inducing large-scale change through non-violent 
political processes grounded in law’.11He further argued that in some instances transformative 
constitutionalism encounters a restraining force from the prevailing static legal culture, the 
result being the resistance of transformation.12A pre-constitutional legal culture that is static 
and representative of  ‘a set of intellectual habits’ that uncritically accepts legal practices of 
apartheid land law, stifles the progression of the Constitution’s transformative aspirations and 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Preamble and subsections 1(a), 7(2) and 39(1)(a) of the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108 of 1996. 
9 K Klare (note 3) at 154. 
10 The Constitutional Court implicitly recognized the redistributive aspirations of the Constitution in 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 63-69. My 
emphasis. 




slows down the rate of transformation.13 He argues that by adhering to the tenets of 
transformative constitutionalism, South Africa will be better placed in strengthening the 
projects of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement.14 This will invariably 
strengthen the commitment towards the reconstruction and transformation of the current legal 
and socio economic cultures, which arguably safeguard the remnants of apartheid land law 
within a new constitutional democracy.15  
Upon examination of South Africa’s constitutional democracy one becomes aware 
that the current legal culture (in the context of an unqualified protection of existing property 
rights) has influenced the interpretation, application and enforcement of section 25. The 
current legal culture has also influenced how section 25 and its underlying values and 
principles, influence the advancement of socio-economic development in the area of land 
reform. The current legal culture appears to differ from the ideals of transformative 
constitutionalism in that the desire for legal formalism and conservatism often obstructs the 
transformation, and development of a legal culture primarily concerned with the 
Constitution’s transformative aspirations. This reality is relevant in the context of the need to 
showcase how a post constitutional legal culture ought to influence the interpretation, 
application and enforcement of section 25, and how the values and principles underlying 
section 25 ought to drive the process of transformation and land redistribution. 
  Despite the tendency of the current legal culture to revert to a conservative and 
formalistic approach towards the constitutional interpretation, enactment and enforcement of 
s 25 the Constitution establishes the necessary normative institutional framework through 
which the ideals of large scale, and egalitarian socio-economic transformation are capable of 
being infused into the current legal culture. 
The commitment towards achieving substantive justice, represents a shift in the roles 
of institutions responsible for promoting and supporting a system of transformative 
constitutionalism that creates an egalitarian society of justice oriented ideology. This 
ideology is capable of safeguarding the interests held by previously disadvantaged black 
majority, in relation to access and ownership of land. The institutions include the judiciary 
                                                          
13 AJ van der Walt “Legal History, Legal Culture and Transformation in a Constitutional Democracy” 2006 (12) 
Fundima at 18. 




and other quasi-judicial bodies presenting the Constitution and its values in its best light.16 
These institutional bodies are able to present the Constitution in its best light, through the use 
of adjudicative processes that rely on a purposive interpretative approach which 
acknowledges the comprehensive transformative ambition of the Constitution.  
It is argued that the Constitution has embedded within it what Karl Klare describes as 
a ‘transformative constitutional ethos’ which informs a commitment to long term projects of 
constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement.17 The Constitution subscribes to a 
value-laden system that defines its transformative role and mission, and guides it’s 
understanding of that role and mission in regards to the projects of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation and enforcement.18 The values assist the Constitution to become more social, 
redistributive, caring and self-conscious of the historical context, in the way it regards its 
transformative mission.19 
  The commitment to the progressive transformation of South Africa’s land holding and 
ownership regime relies on the support that is given to these projects.20 This means that 
‘transformative constitutionalism’ invites what Klare remarks as “the adoption and 
development of a new imagination and self-reflection about legal method, analysis and 
reasoning consistent with the Constitution’s transformative goals”.21  The implications that 
this has for section 25 and land reform is progressive, in that section 25 and the underlying 
transformative values can be harnessed to change the status quo ante and to level the 
economic playing field between the interests of existing property holders and the aspirations 
of the previously dispossessed. This is to be achieved through the adoption of a critical 
reflection of the analysis, legal method and reasoning of property law in a manner that is 
consistent with the Constitution transformative goals. The implications of this is that section 
25 can be utilised as a mechanism to facilitate transformation of the existing property law 
(which by and large still depends on traditional rules and institutions like private ownership, 
                                                          
16 Roux T ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South African Constitution: 
Distinction without difference’ Stellenbosch Law Review 258-285. 
17 K Klare (note 3) at 150. 
18 The value laden system is laid out in the Preamble. Of importance are the following for emphasis: “Heal the 
divisions of the past and establish a society in which government is based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights”. “Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person’’. 
19 This is confirmed in S v Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665(CC) at para 262. 
20 Klare (note 3) at 150. 
21 Ibid at 156. 
7 
 
with their predilection for the strict protection of existing property interests)22,  in order to 
facilitate the right to access to land through state expropriation and land redistribution.23  
What will follow is a brief discussion of the Bill of Rights and the particular 
importance of section 25, in relation to provisions dealing with the state’s obligation to 
respect, promote and fulfil section 25. 
 
2.2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ITS ROLE IN DEFINING THE 
STATE’S ROLE IN THE PROMOTION, RESPECT AND 
FULFILLMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION’S TRANSFORMATIVE 
AGENDA. 
 The South African Bill of Rights epitomise a post liberal constitutional democracy 
founded on the values of human dignity, the advancement of human rights and freedoms 
within a democratic state.24 What is unique about the South African Bill of Rights is that it 
was drafted in such a way so as to render the rights enshrined therein to be capable of being 
given concrete effect, through subjecting the rights to judicial enforcement.25 Another unique 
aspect of the Bill of Rights is the inclusion of economic and social rights which set out the 
obligations imposed upon the state and its functionaries, to establish effective measures that 
give effect to their progressive realisation. The measures that impose these obligations 
operate in negative and positive ways. For the purposes of this dissertation I will be focusing 
particularly on section 25(4), section 25(5) and section 25(8), and the positive duties these 
provisions impose upon the state to provide for equitable access to and ownership of land 
through the implementation of policies centred on the expropriation and redistribution of 
land.26  
Section 7(2) of the Constitution sets out the state’s primary role of creating an 
environment through which persons are capable of not only accessing a right, as entrenched 
in the constitution, but advancing the realisation of that right in order to give effect to the 
transformative ethos of the Constitution. The commitment to such an endeavour ensures that 
                                                          
22 AJ van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” 2005 at 402. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Chris Landsberg & Shaun Mackay “South Africa 1994-2004” a chapter from “Reflections on Democracy and 
Human Rights: A decade of the South African Constitution” 2006, available at www.sahrc.org.za  at 6. 
25 Sandra Liebenberg “Human Development and Human Rights South African Country Study” Human 
Development Report 2000 Background Paper accessed on the 30th of September at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/sandra_liebenberg.pdf at 8. 
26 Section 25(5)-(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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the state remains committed to the long term project of the constitutional enactment of 
legislation and policies which not only establish a more just social order, but progressively 
‘shift the South African land regime from one of unjust domination on the basis of skin 
colour and status to one that complies with the transformative ethos of the Constitution’.27 
Section 7(2) is particularly important for practical purposes because it indicates the scope and 
nature of the entitlements of section 25 (4) to 25(8) as well as outlining when and how the 
right can be used to advance a claim.28 The practical implications of this is that the 
constitutional long term projects of constitutional interpretation and enforcement are 
enhanced and strengthened,  whenever the judiciary is charged with determining whether the 
state has acted in accordance with its positive duty to Section 7(2) and more broadly 
speaking, the Constitution’s transformative ethos. 
Section 7(2) applies to all organs of state, that is the executive and the legislature 
within the national, provincial and local spheres of government, and these particular organs 
are required by the Constitution to engage fully in their positive duties to fulfil the right as 
representative of the Constitution’s underlying transformative ethos. The branches, as 
components of the state, must ‘adopt appropriate legislation, executive policy, and other 
measures’ in order to ensure that those who are currently unable to enjoy access to equitable 
land are able to do so, as a result of the implementation of effective land reform policies and 
programmes.29  
When one considers how section 25, particularly subsections (4)-(8), is framed we can 
see how important the provision is in practically setting out the nature and scope of the state’s 
duty to promote and fulfil the underlying transformative ethos embedded in section 25, 
through the implementation of land reform policies and programmes. It is argued that section 
7(2) plays a crucial role in focussing the lens through which the interpretation and 
enforcement of the underlying transformative values and principles embedded in section 25, 
can be utilised to ascertain whether the state has truly acted in accordance with the 
Constitution’s transformative agenda of transforming the prevailing land regime.  
 
2.3    CONCLUSION 
                                                          
27 Hanri Mostert “Land restitution, social justice and development in South Africa’’ (2002) 119 South African 
Law Journal at 402. 
28  Brand & Christof Heyns “Introduction to socio economic rights in the South African Constitution” (1998) 2 
Law, Democracy and Development 153 at 9. 
29 Ibid at 10. 
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Prior to the advent of the Constitution property rights in relation to access and 
ownership of land, were informed by the discriminatory edifice of the apartheid land law 
system. The legacy of such a system had to be dismantled in order to make way for the 
adoption of a constitutional democratic project, committed to a reform of the land law system 
representative of an equitable system of land rights. In order to better understand how the 
need for the adoption of land reform programmes and policies influenced the formulation of 
section 25 in its current state, inclusive of provisions advancing the Constitution’s 
transformative agenda, what will follow is a discussion of the legislative history surrounding 
property rights and the effect that history had on the development of a land law system 
preceding the advent of the Constitution. 
  
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
3.1   The legacy of the colonial conquest period and the apartheid regime following it, 
worked effectively to restructuring ownership and control of resources in South Africa.30 
Legislative measures were enacted to restrict access, control and ownership of the 
country’s land to only thirteen per cent of which eighty per cent of the black South 
African population would be entitled to access, control and own.31 These legislative 
measures entrenched deep disparities between the minority white population who owned 
and controlled majority of the land, thereby acquiring and sustaining wealth, and the 
majority black population being subjected to large scale poverty due to landlessness.32 
The project of acquisition of land from the black majority advanced by the colonial 
regime, systematically institutionalised an informal system of spatial separation based on 
race.33 The purpose was to swiftly acquire land in order to develop a land regime which 
secured economic domination of land, in favour of the individuals who acquired land 
from colonial powers. The acquisition of this land was made possible by the promulgation 
of a long line of racially motivated land laws.34 These respective land laws reinforced the 
                                                          
30 Hanri Mostert (note 27) at 403. 
31 T W Bennett 1996) 'African land -A history of dispossession' in Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa at 65. 
32 Hanri Mostert (note 27) at 401. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Black Land Act 27 of 1913. This act provided the statutory basis for territorial segregation by dividing 
South Africa into the so-called 'black spots' on the one hand and the 'non-African' areas on the other hand. The 
latter covered approximately 87 per cent of the country's surface area and black South Africans could not 
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apartheid government’s access and control of land as a resource, in order to 
institutionalise racial and socio economic class segregation by developing a hierarchical 
‘primacy’ of ownership in terms of private law.35 
 
The apartheid land laws36 operated together to fragment the racial groups of the Black, 
Coloured and Indian population, by assigning portions of land mass to specific groups of 
people based on their race.37 The purpose of these policies underpinning these laws was the 
removal of land as a resource/commodity from the other racial groups, in order to secure the 
best economically valuable pieces of land (i.e. agricultural and residential) which was then to 
be reallocated to the minority white population. This was done in order to entrench a system 
of land rights to which ownership, in terms of a civil law-oriented private law system, was 
protected.38 The result of the enactment of these laws and the implementation of these 
policies underpinning these laws was that a legal institution of property law, became an 
effective vehicle through which land rights for the white minority ensured strong and 
effective protection against any infringement of their land rights.39 The majority Black, 
Coloured and Indian population however were subjected to a flawed allocation of land rights 
at a remarkably lower value, based on a private-civil land law system which didn’t provide 
them with the same kind of protection.40 In essence the majority Black, Coloured and Indian 
population received rights only to ‘statutory defined tribal land’ or land rights solely based on 
land granted to them by government, through the issuing of ‘residential permits or certificates 
of occupation’.41 
Arising from the dark depths of the apartheid period, the collective negotiations 
between liberation groups and the old apartheid regime sought to reform the old property 
regime in order to institutionalise a constitutional order predicated on the ethos of 
transformative constitutionalism. The motivation behind this was to ensure rectification of the 
state of affairs stemming from the old property regime. The Constitutional negotiations 
sought to establish a more just political, social and legal system which reformed land and 
                                                          
purchase, hire or in any other way acquire rights to land in these areas. See A J van der Walt 'Property rights 
and hierarchies of power: A critical evaluation of land-reform policy in South Africa' (1999) 64 Koers 259 at 
261-3. 
35 AJ Van der Walt (note 1) at 261-263. 
36 The Black Land Act and the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. 







property distributions in order to facilitate for greater access to land, through the 
implementation of land reform policies such as expropriation. The negotiations further sought 
to arrange the new constitutional property regime in such a way as to provide the state with 
enough institutional mechanisms to alleviate poverty, by reversing the effects of the unjust 
system of land distribution and land ownership rights.  
Following from the legislative history of property rights prior to the Constitution, I 
will now consider an evaluation of the constitutional negotiations held before the introduction 
of the Constitution in order to debate how the new constitutional order not only 
acknowledged individual rights to ownership of property, but also committed itself to a 
transformative agenda premised on the transformation of the existing land regime by way of 
land reformation and the redistribution of land through expropriation as espoused in section 
25(4)(a) and section 25(5). 
  
3.2 AN EVALUATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND 
DEBATE SURROUNDING THE FRAMING OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
LAND REFORM BROUGHT ABOUT SECTION 25. 
 
At the negotiation table the African National Congress together with other liberation 
parties acknowledged that the effects of hardship in the form of poverty and socio economic 
exclusion from equitable development,  needed to be addressed by advocating for policies 
centred on the return of the land “to those who worked for it”.42 It appeared that at the cusp of 
the transition from one regime to another was the key issue of land reform, and how such an 
issue would find a place in South Africa’s new constitutional order.43 Although the then 
ruling National Party was made aware of the need to broker agreement between itself and the 
other negotiating parties by committing to some form of land reform, the National Party was 
reluctant to move away from the protection of existing property rights in the new 
Constitution.44 This brought about numerous stalemates and breakdowns in negotiations. 
                                                          
42 The Freedom Charter of 1955, one of the ANC's foundational documents, declares that “[r]restrictions of land 
ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided amongst those who work it to banish 
famine and land hunger”. Land reform, in one form or another, has always been on the agenda of the ANC. 
43 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (hereafter 'interim Constitution') in 
subsections 8 and 121-3 made special provision for land reform, and particularly for the restitution of land. 
44 Jill Zimmerman “Property on the line: Is an expropriation-centred land reform constitutionally permissible?” 
(2005) South African Law Journal 122 at 380. 
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However, despite the stalemates and breakdowns compromises were made in order to push 
forward a successful transition to a new constitutional democracy. 
South Africa’s constitution was formulated in two stages, the interim Constitution of 
1993 (the first stage in which initial negotiations between the African National Congress and 
the National Party were staged) followed by the final Constitution of 1996 which was drafted 
by the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly.45 How the Constitution was to 
ultimately approach and deal with property rights on one hand, and the commitment to a 
transformative agenda of land reform on the other was very contentious during both stages of 
negotiations and drafting.46 From the beginning of the negotiations, the notion of land reform 
premised on expropriations was placed at the forefront of the debate surrounding the 
preferred approach to property rights in the Constitution.47 During the negotiation stage of the 
Interim Constitution, the African National Congress had presented draft land and property 
clauses in May 1992 which heavily focused on equitable redistribution of land and which 
contemplated the use of expropriation to service land reform in order to address poverty and 
landlessness.48 Despite the African National Congress having presented its vision for 
property, the Multi party negotiating members sought to adopt a different vision for property 
by formulating a property clause in the Interim Constitution which, by its language, 
questioned the economic feasibility of an expropriation driven land reform.49 The African 
National Congress and the other allied parties rejected the terms of the formulated property 
clause included within the Interim Constitution, citing that a compromise to such a clause 
would serve to entrench forever rather than reverse the inequality and injustice of apartheid.50 
 
Cyril Ramaphosa, having been appointed as the chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly charged with drafting the final Constitution, found himself in a precarious position 
                                                          
45 Ibid at 383. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 The full text of these clauses are available in: The African National Congress ‘A Bill of Rights for the New 
South Africa’ as quoted by Chaskalson in “Negotiations over the protection of property rights in the interim 
Constitution” (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 222 at 238. 
49 Although land reform was called for by the interim Constitution, it was kept separate from the property clause 
at the National Party's insistence and appeared instead in the equality clause. Apparently, the National Party's 
insistence on this transfer was predicated on the premise that, if land rights were discussed under the heading 
'property', the property clause might be read to protect only rights in land, leaving other forms of property 
unprotected; Chaskalson (note 48) at 231-232; See also The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
200n0f 1003 (hereafter interim constitution’) subsections 8 and 121-123. 
50 Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 384. 
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in terms of promoting the African National Congress’s first choice51 or advancing a property 
clause that was sensitive to the interests of white agriculture and the white business 
community.52 The ANC had however relooked at its initial stance by September 1995 and 
had conceded and accepted the inclusion of a property clause that would describe the 
circumstances under which property may be expropriated, rather than restate those property 
rights which already existed.53 This new position was presented during further negotiations 
between the National and Democratic Parties and other allied parties. The National Party 
(NP), representing the interests of the white minority, were opposed to the ambitions of 
redistribution of land as laid out in the African National Congress’s new stance. In order to 
resolve the breakdown in negotiation and advance the successful transition from the old 
regime to the constitutional democracy, all parties conceded to drafting a clause which was to 
achieve some compromise between the two widely divergent positions on property.54 Section 
25 of the Final Constitution is the result of that compromise. Section 25 outlines: 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application- 
(a) For a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of 
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including- 
(a) The current use of the property; 
(b) The history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) The market value of the property; 
(d) The extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property; and 
                                                          
51 Right up until the deadline, the ANC maintained that its first choice with respect to the legal recognition of 
property was that property should not be protected in the Constitution at all; Baleka Mbete-Kgositsile pointed 
out that the ANC's goal was to ensure “that poverty and landlessness would be addressed in the new 
dispensation”: Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 384. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid: It was also around this time that the ANC took the decision to address land rights for the landless and 
existing property rights in a single clause, to avoid the possibility that the latter rights could be adjudged to 
override the former in a balancing contest between competing rights; See also Katherine Savage 'Negotiating 
South Africa's new Constitution: An overview of the key players and 
the negotiation process’ at 178. 
54 Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 384 
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(e) The purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) The public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to 
bring about equitable access to land on all South Africa’s natural resources: and 
(b) Property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 19213 as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state form taking legislative and other 
measurers to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past 
racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in 
accordance with the provisions of section 36(1). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
 
A number of party advisers and external interests’ groups participated in the on-going 
debate on property as the negotiations continued between the African National Congress, the 
National Party and other allied parties for the formulation and drafting of the final 
constitution. These interested parties sought to lobby the National Party to broker an 
agreement for the formulation of the right to property along the lines of the right to ‘acquire 
and hold’ as was contained in the Interim Constitution.55 On the flip side the external 
interested parties of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the 
National Land Committee (NLC), lobbied the African National Congress to push for a 
property clause that would not entrench existing inequalities but would rather advance 
commitment to land reform in the Final Constitution.56 
                                                          
55 When it came time for the newly appointed Constitutional Court to certify compliance with the Constitutional 
Principles, the National Party launched an unsuccessful challenge to the clause's validity. In failing to provide 
for a positive right to acquire and hold property, the National Party argued, the clause contravened 
Constitutional Principle I1, which required that the Constitution entrench 'all universally accepted fundamental 
rights, freedoms and civil liberties'. The Constitutional Court held that 'no universally recognised formulation of 
the right to property exists': Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 72. 






 Despite a divergence of views of the ideal constructed version of the property clause 
that is entrenched in the final Constitution, it is commonly accepted that section 25 was 
constructed with the foresight that it would facilitate rather than frustrate land reform.57 
Section 25 not only secures existing property holdings against improper state interference, 
but makes explicit provision for land reform including provision for regulating deprivation 
and for expropriation for the sake of land reform.58 Upon reflection of section 25 in this 
mould I submit that it would not be unreasonable to take the position that there is no need for 
amendments to section 25, in order to ensure that progressive land reform occurs.  The 
Constitution, particularly section 25, creates a sufficient framework in which government is 
capable of invoking its powers of expropriation to promote and facilitate effective land 
reform, for the purposes of advancing the redistribution of land. However, my observation of 
the current state of land reformation and the debate surrounding the lack of transformation in 
this area has lead me to hypothesise that the state’s failure to progressively unfold a 
programme of land reform is solely as a result it’s misguided interpretation of section 25 as 
an obstacle to progressive land reform policies.59 I hypothesise that this misguided 
interpretation has contributed to the state’s inability to follow section 25’s constitutionally 
mandated guidelines of advancing land reform policies that ensure that there is an equitable 
distribution of land.60 I intend to explore this hypotheses and debate them further as the thesis 
moves along.  
From this point, I will consider the relevant academic literature that has helped shape 
my understanding of the debate on land reform, the right to equitable access to land and the 
protection of existing property rights. 
 
4 LITERATURE REVIEW OF RELEVANT ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
                                                          
57 AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay an equitable compensation 
for expropriation” 2006 123 South African Law Journal at 26. 
58 AJ Van der Walt (note 1) at 282. 
59 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at para 64 
60 Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 399. 
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4.1 CURRENT LITERATURE RELEVANT TO RESEARCH QUESTION 
South Africa’s final Constitution has been acknowledged as a text that possesses 
transformative ideals and principles that drive a continuous process of institutional 
transformation of South Africa’s democratic society, based on values of non-racialism, non-
sexism, the Bill of Rights and the rule of law.61 With principles and values of substantive 
equality freedom and human dignity underpinning the Constitution’s transformative agenda, 
South Africa’s Constitution is concerned with the enterprise of inducing a major social, 
political and legal change to South Africa’s land ownership regime. The mechanisms that 
embody the Constitution’s hope of a transformed society in which the previous unjust 
apartheid land law system is readdressed, are sections 25(2), sections 25(5), s25(7) and 
sections 25(8) of the Bill of Rights. 
Several articles have been written addressing the role of sections 25(2), 25(3), 25(5) 
and 25(8) in facilitating expropriation centred land reform by the state, whilst preserving the 
fundamental guarantees of property rights reflected in s 25(1).  In this dissertation, at least 
four articles are reflected upon. I selected these particular articles as they are relevant to my 
enquiry of whether the law, and specifically section 25, has stood in the way of government 
in unfolding a programme of land reform that is consistent with the objectives of s 25(5). 
These particular articles discuss the contentious and progressive aspects of the South African 
legal discourse surrounding section 25, and land reform since 1993. Furthermore these 
articles critically reflect on the impact that the current legal culture has had on the use of 
‘available tools and methods for construing and implementing law(section 25) as an agent of 
transformation’.62 The articles underscore the need for imagination and development of 
alternative ways of reading, interpreting and thinking about property, property rights and the 
constitutional protection of property in light of the constitutional obligation to promote land 
reform.63 These articles are crucial to my inquiry as they outline the constitutional guidelines 
that the state should to be mindful of in order to creatively overcome the challenge of 
protecting vested property interests, and at the same time broadening access to land through 
land reform for the purposes of redistribution. 
                                                          
61  Mashele Rapatsa (note 2) at 888. 
62 WJE Du Plessis ‘Compensation for Expropriation’ LLD (North West Univerisity) 2009, available at 
www.ssrm.com/abstract=24663639, accessed on 16 February 2017 at 6. 
63 AJ van der Walt (note 57) at 31-32. 
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My perspective of whether the construction and content of property rights, as included 
in section 25(1), has helped or hindered the transformative purpose of the Constitution and 
specifically the state’s commitment to land reform, is informed by theoretical perspectives. 
These perspectives suggest that the drafters of the Constitution intended the long term 
projects of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of 
sections 25(2), 25(4), 25(5) and 25(8), to facilitate a transformation of the apartheid land law 
system and power relations that is reflective of “participatory and egalitarian democracy”.64 
Understanding the essence of Klare’s65 theorisation of South Africa’s transformative 
Constitution helps develop the foundations of a common understanding that the Constitution, 
through the Bill of Rights, endeavours to recreate a society which is vastly different from the 
past in terms of a land law system that was in disparity with the rights of the marginalised 
majority. His theory in my opinion best develops a solid foundation upon which an effective 
analytical framework is developed, whereby the processes of law-making, adjudication and 
legal culture can be analysed critically in order to determine how extensively these processes 
operate as mediums for accomplishing socio-economic change and social justice.66 His work 
is a good starting point because it positions the constitution and its transformative aspirations 
at the centre of an advanced, progressive and innovative democracy that is not only self-
conscious of the importance of its continuous development, but is committed to innovating its 
law-making, adjudication and legal culture practices into appropriate mediums for achieving 
social justice and socio-economic transformation.67  Klare based his understanding of the 
Constitution on the precepts of transformative constitutionalism, which endeavours to 
institutionalise a normative framework of legal principles and values that guide systematic 
processes of legal change.68 Such change can be characterised in the underlying principles 
and values that permeate within the provisions of section 25(2), 25(4), 25(5 ) and 25(8), 
which seek to entrench and re-establish  fundamental rights to ownership and access to 
property that was previously dispossessed. 
Klare’s writings highlight that often times the legal culture and its relationship with 
the judiciary, the legislature and the executive, shape section 25’s transformative agenda in 
terms of how it is to be interpreted and how provisions dealing with land reform are to be 
applied and enforced. Section 25 fundamentally provides guidelines on how the state is to 
                                                          
64 Karl Klare (note 3) at 150. 
65 Ibid. 
66 K Klare (note 3) at 147. 




manage the tension between protecting vested property interests, and at the same time 
broadening access to land through land reform measures such as expropriation for the 
purposes land redistribution.69 However, post-apartheid property law and the current legal 
culture surrounding it are still very much defined by traditional rules and institutions like 
private ownership, that still have a predilection for the strict protection of property interests at 
the peril of  land reform initiatives.70 This may very well result in an obscuring of section 
25’s transformative potential. This ties in with the fundamental theoretical foundation of the 
dissertation which seeks to ascertain as to whether the law, as captured in section 25, can be 
interpreted and applied in such a manner as to impede the state from unfolding programmes 
of land reform. 
Borrowing from Klare and his writings on transformative constitutionalism and its 
relationship with the concept of legal culture, creates the foundation upon which one can 
frame the argument that South Africa’s legal culture has arguably remained conservative and 
formalist in form. This has lent to what may be argued as structural impediments curtailing 
the comprehensive realisation of the transformative agenda of land reform, as envisaged in 
section 25(2), 25(4), 25(5) and 25(8). Taking from his writings I put forward the argument 
that the infusion of transformative constitutional norms within the fabric of section 25, 
enables the judiciary, the legislature and the executive from not being constrained in the 
interpretation, application and enforcement of section 25(2) to 25(8). The infusion of these 
transformative constitutional norms within these provisions, create a legal framework through 
which socio-economic transformation receives constitutional justification through law and 
policy. The ‘infusion’ impacts on law reform policies and programmes because the 
constitutional norms prioritize the development of laws and policies as mechanisms and tools 
which are capable of being construed, and implemented as agents of transformation. The by-
product is the adoption of laws and policies that are not only insulated from constitutional 
attack, but are empowered to pursue the establishment of a more equitable system of land 
rights for those previously dispossessed. 
In light of Klare’s writings on transformative constitutionalism and the legal culture 
thereof, Jill Zimmerman71 critically explores whether expropriation centred land reform can 
be constitutionally permissible in light of the complexities of South Africa’s constitutional 
                                                          
69 WJE du Plessis (note 62) at 6. 
70 AJ van der Walt (note 22) at 402; WJE du Plessis (note 62) at 6. 
71 Jill Zimmerman (note 44). 
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dispensation. Like Klare Zimmerman concurs that South Africa’s constitution, particularly 
section 25, possesses a principal characteristic that fundamentally expands and reinforces the 
ideals of a commitment to transformation within the legal realities of society. These include; 
legal realities surrounding the reconstruction of an equitable system of land rights through 
expropriation and land distribution.72 Zimmerman highlights that the Constitution was 
constructed in such a way as to provide flexible limits of constitutionally permissible land 
reform that is in keeping with the constitution’s aspirational commitment to transformation 
and the achievement of social justice. However, Zimmerman is quick to highlight in her work 
that the current policy environment surrounding South Africa’s current land regime, is 
distinct from the policy options offered by the flexible limits of constitutionally permissible 
land reform that is provided in subsections 25 (2), 25(3), 25(4), 25(5) and 25(8).  For 
Zimmerman, “the flexible limits of constitutionally permissible land reform form the 
normative basis upon which the property clause can facilitate a substantive period of resource 
redistribution”.73 For Zimmerman the most significant aspect of section 25 is its flexibility in 
managing a fluid balance between the protection of private property interests, and the special 
constitutional priority of the promotion of land reform in the interest of the public. 
Zimmerman asserts that the language of subsections 25(2) and 25(3), both on their own and 
in synergy with section 25(4)(a), section 25(5) and section 25(8), can be construed to suggest 
that a substantial form of resource redistribution is possible through the adoption of 
progressive and innovative expropriation measures for the purposes of land reform. In other 
words, she asserts that the textual synergy could be understood as providing a springboard for 
a more substantial form of resource redistribution.   
 Zimmerman makes a good case that the proponents of the transformative 
constitutionalism project (concurring with Klare) as undertaken by section 25, are to be 
understood as regulating rather than obstructing the expropriation process.74 According to 
Zimmerman this will “enable landless people and the civil society organizations the ability to 
claim the constitutional high ground in negotiating with government, questions of land 
reform and the subsequent enforcement of land reform through expropriation”.75 
Accordingly, the transformative agenda embedded in the constitutional text of section 25 
empowers the Constitutional Court to safeguard the interests and rights of all people, 
                                                          






particularly the vulnerable groups, to an equitable system of land rights. Zimmerman 
envisages that this will occur through the Constitutional Court exercising its authority in the 
implementation of constitutional interpretation, as a mechanism for ensuring that any 
enactment by the legislature and policies developed by the executive adhere to the 
Constitution’s desired transformative ambitions through the legal culture of justification.76 
It is important to enquire how section 25(2), 25(3), 25(4), 25(5) and 25(8) can be 
made effective to bring about its transformative ambitions. It is at this juncture that 
Zimmerman takes a step further than Klare in arguing that the transformative ambitions of 
section 25(2), 25(3), 25(5) and 25(8)  are capable of being interpreted by the Constitutional 
Court as characterising appropriate mechanisms for expropriation (for purposes of land 
redistribution), as of special constitutional priority thereby justifying the state to compensate 
at well below the rates ordinarily attaching to expropriations for less urgent public purposes.77 
I intend to use this assertion by Zimmerman to address the lack of progressive expropriation 
and land redistribution programmes focused on transforming the present land law regime, in 
order to accommodate the standardized, transnational property rights discourse emphasizing 
the centrality of market value compensation by the state. This invariably discourages the state 
from taking necessary steps to affect transformation and the achievement of social justice as 
envisaged by the Constitution.  Zimmerman’s interpretation on section 25 which takes into 
account the underlying transformative ideals and the achievement of social justice, is 
particularly useful when considering the role the judiciary plays in interpreting the 
constitutional text as a regulator and not an obstructer of expropriation for the purposes of 
land reform.78 Drawing from Zimmerman’s piece enables one to highlight the importance 
that constitutional interpretation plays in placing the Constitution in its best light, thus 
ensuring that legislation or policies enacted by the Legislature and developed by the 
Executive, give greater impetus to section 25’s fundamental transformative constitutional 
values.  
Hanri Mostert’s 79 piece on land restitution, social justice and development in South 
Africa takes a look at how the unfortunate history of ownership and property rights of the 
apartheid land law regime and the present disparity of wealth in society, have created the 




79 Hanri Mostert (note 27) at 400. 
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urgent need for progressive land reform.80 According to Mostert that need for reform of the 
South African land law system inherited from the past apartheid land regime, is reflected by 
the transformative ideals embedded in section 25 of the final Constitution.81 She presents her 
inquiry on the progress of land reform by critically evaluating the endeavours of the 
legislature in their constitutional enactment of land restitution programmes furthering land 
reform, and the endeavours of the judiciary in their constitutional interpretation of section 25 
in furthering land reform. It is through this evaluation that a clearer perspective on whether 
the Constitution itself, particularly section 25, provides for a normative framework conducive 
to the establishment of a restitution programme which seeks to provide for a more just social 
order through the transformation of South Africa’s land law regime so as to affect socio-
economic development.82 Mostert’s inquiry is different to my inquiry in that she explores the 
progress of land reform through the constitutional enactment of one of the broad land reform 
projects, land restitution (section 25(7)). My inquiry is concerned with the issue of 
expropriation for the purposes of achieving land reform through the land redistribution 
project. My inquiry specifically looks at whether expropriation can substantially advance land 
reform as entrenched in section 25(5), to the extent that it fosters the necessary conditions 
that will enable equal access to land. 
Again, Mostert like Zimmerman seems to consider how the Constitution, which 
envisages transformation and the achievement of social justice, can be made more effective in 
realizing these transformative ideals. She approaches this question by considering how 
section 25 envisages the process of land law reform and whether this process resolves to give 
effect to the establishment and maintenance of a more just distribution of property and of 
greater access to land and security of land tenure. According to Mostert, the concepts of 
social justice and development reinforce the Bill of Rights underlying value framework. This 
becomes apparent when these concepts drive the transformative processes of the levelling off 
of all inequalities, systematically reconciling diverse social interests and facilitating 
meaningful improvement of the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable groups. These 
transformative processes, reinforced by the concepts of social justice and development, 
become key elements to socio economic reconstruction in the context of the treatment of 
access to and ownership of land ownership.83  
                                                          
80 Ibid at 402 
81 Ibid. 
82 Hanri Mostert (note 27) at 400. 
83 Ibid at 404. 
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Mostert makes a good case on how political, economic and socio-cultural factors 
often shape the development process and establishment of social justice, which may often 
result in the development of extensive land reform programmes that are either aimed at 
thoroughly rectifying inequalities in existing land distribution patterns, or that are restricted 
to just providing financial or other support services.84 Mostert highlights in her work that 
section 25 sets out a broad land reform programme which is comprised of three separate but 
interconnected elements namely (i) restitution, (ii) redistribution of land, and (iii) land tenure 
reform. She focuses on the general responsibility of the legislature, working alongside the 
executive, to promulgate legislation in relation to the broad land reform programmes in order 
to give effect to the broad constitutional objectives of land reform.85  
According to AJ van der Walt86, the prevailing land law system that predated the 
interim and final Constitution was responsible for creating and institutionalising a framework 
of land rights that guaranteed apartheid’s segregationist aspirations, with regard to the 
physical security and economic power derived from owning and holding land. He argues that 
together with the ideological policies of apartheid and the Roman Dutch private law view of 
property, the definition, maintenance and protection of land rights in a spatialized framework 
emphasized the exclusivity of individual and race group holdings.87 Van der Walt draws 
attention to the fact that the Roman Dutch private property law regime88 (which he describes 
as “a system of mutually demarcated and exclusive rights, backed up by a system of remedies 
that are aimed at preventing interference, reclaiming property following dispossession and 
compensation for loss caused by unlawful interference”) reinforced the ideological, 
conceptual and systematic codes of apartheid land law and the common law of that time.89 
However, at the turn of democracy and the transitional shift from apartheid to constitutional 
democracy, a reform of the prior land regime was needed in order to realign it with the 
Constitution’s transformative ideals of social justice and development.  
                                                          
84 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) available at www.rural 
development.gov.za/white-papers/whitepaperlandreform.pdf, accessed on the 04.01.2017. 
85 AJ van der Walt “Property rights and hierarchies of power: A critical evaluation of land reform policy in 
South Africa” (1999) 64 Koers at 69. 
86 AJ Van der Walt (note 1) at 258. 
87 Ibid at 271. 
88 Van der Walt’s interpretation of the apartheid land law is premised on the principles of the Roman Dutch 
private property law, which he describes ‘as a system of mutually demarcated and exclusive rights, backed up 
by a system of remedies that are aimed at preventing interference, reclaiming property following dispossession 




For Van der Walt the merit of South Africa’s land reform depends on how far it 
succeeds in breaking away from the ideological language, conceptual and systematic codes of 
apartheid land law and the common law.90 He argues that although the turn of constitutional 
democracy has brought about the proliferation of transformative constitutionalism, in the 
form of land reform, the transformative jurisprudence remains locked in a struggle against the 
conceptual codes which continue to recognise the hierarchical, exclusionary Roman Dutch 
law view of property and property rights, as reflected in section 25(1). I put forward the 
argument that Van der Walt’s article draws one to consider the possibility that the state’s 
current outlook of section 25(1) and section 25(5), 25(7), and 25(8), does not sufficiently take 
into consideration the Constitution’s transformative ambition. This is to the extent that the 
state is unable to break from the Roman Dutch conceptual rhetoric of hierarchical individual 
exclusive land rights, thereby giving effect to the explicit provisions of land reform.  
4.2 CONCLUSION 
Having outlined the various positions held by a number of academics in the debate 
surrounding the most suitable, and effective approach to the issue of land reform in section 
25, I will now analyse the Constitutional’s Courts approach to interpreting section 25 in light 
of explicit provisions authorising the implementation of land reform programmes. From this 
point, I will consider the various layers of context that inform the Court’s constitutional 
interpretation of section 25.91 This will assist me in analysing and discussing the 
Constitution’s fundamental values as identified by the Court, and the tensions raised between 
individual property rights and social justice aspirations whenever the Court employs a 
purposive mode of interpretation. Next, I will address the Court’s approach to property rights 
and the land reform clauses in section 25(2), 25(3), 25(5) and 25(8) and how this relates to 
the general limitations clause. 
 
5. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
5.1. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 25 OF 
THE FINAL CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S 
PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION 
                                                          
90 AJ van der Walt (note 1) at 283. 




     The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court92 has confirmed Klare’s post liberal 
reading93 and Gloppen’s social justice model94 that the Constitution is committed to 
transformation and, the achievement of social justice. This was reflected in its first in depth 
consideration of the property clause in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). The court referring to van der Walt stated ‘ When 
considering the purpose and content of the property clause it is necessary to move away from 
a static, typically private-law conceptualist view of the Constitution as a guarantee of the 
status quo to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the Constitution as an instrument for 
social change and transformation under the auspices of entrenched constitutional values’.95 
The Constitutional Court’s conception of the Constitution as an instrument for social change 
and transformation enabled the court to develop a purposive approach to constitutional 
interpretation, that would anchor its role as the ‘legitimator’ of the post-apartheid socio-
economic transformation project. 
    Upon reflection the Court’s purposive approach to constitutional interpretation requires the 
Court to follow an interpretative framework taking into account foundational and guiding 
values of the Constitution’s transformative agenda/ambition, whenever the Court considers 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.96 How the Constitutional Court has approached the 
interpretation of the property clause with respect to state-led land redistribution initiatives, 
cannot be fully appreciated without critically examining the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence in relation to the state facilitating the achievement of a more egalitarian society. 
 
5.1.1 FOUNDATIONAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE PURPOSIVE 
MODE OF INTERPRETATION: 
                                                          
92 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at 794. The Court 
quoting AJ van der Walt in The Constitutional Property Clause: A Comparative Analysis of Section 25 of the 
South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 11. 
93  K Klare (note 3) at 153. 
94  Siri Gloppen South Afiica: The Battle Over the Constitution (1997) at 235-6. Siri Gloppen was of the opinion 
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   The commitment to the transformation of society and social justice in the new 
constitutional democracy, were ideals that became embedded in the fabric of the Constitution 
once they were guaranteed in a cluster of provisions in the Bill of Rights. This was further 
echoed in Soobramoney97 where the Constitutional Court expressed its sentiment that 
‘transformation’ and ‘social justice’, were commitments for which the Constitution aspired to 
achieve in “transforming our society into one which human dignity, freedom and equality 
were realised’’.98 According to the court in Soobramoney the commitment towards 
transformation of society through the employment of social justice mechanisms, remains at 
the core of the new constitutional order.99  
   When examining the property clause, it is clear that in its normative framework existing 
property holdings are not only secured against improper state interference.100 Special 
provisions also manifest the calls to transformation and social justice, which lie at the heart of 
the Constitution; including provisions for regulatory deprivation and expropriation of 
property for the purposes of land reform.101 
   Some commentators of the Constitution have argued that the Constitution’s progressive 
potential is exhibited from the text, which articulates the drafter’s aspirations for 
transformation and societal development.102 The Constitutional Court in the case of 
Makwayane103 sought to tap into this progressive potential by developing its own distinct 
interpretative style. This style of interpretation was to provide the Court with a sufficient 
basis upon which to form its own understanding of the Constitution’s primary goals of 
providing for an effective transition to democracy, and creating development opportunities 
for all.104 The Constitutional Court seemingly engaged with the text of the interim 
constitution drawing from it the idea that ‘democracy’, in the new democratic constitutional 
order, was underscored by the goals of development and social justice. In engaging with the 
text in this manner, the court seemingly read an egalitarian and ‘transformational component’ 
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of ‘development’ and ‘social justice’ into the notion of the South African constitutional 
democracy itself.105 In doing so, the court began developing an interpretative style that would 
draw from its core understanding and reading of South Africa’s constitutional dispensation, 
that of a democracy concerned with transforming society through ‘development opportunities 
for all’. This active core of the court’s reading and understanding of the Constitution’s 
underlying values of transformation and development, underpin the interpretative lens 
through which the provisions of the Bill of Rights are best interpreted. 
  Purposive interpretation is described as a process in which the court considers the 
underlying connections that exist between constitutional provisions, the Constitution and its 
historical context in order to extrapolate clear directions and meanings from the constitutional 
text.106 These connections act as sign posts displaying the foundational democratic values 
guiding and informing the court’s analysis of the text, whenever it embarks on context-based 
line reasoning. Purposive interpretation has enabled the Court to often recognize the 
foundational values hidden away in various rights in the Bill of Rights and to articulate those 
various rights in a manner that is consistent to the Constitution’s goal of ushering in an 
effective transition to democracy and creating equal ‘development opportunities for all’.107  
  Often how the court treats a right, that draws its content from the foundational values 
underpinning the Constitution and its subsequent interpretation, is linked to its textual 
formulation.108 Bearing in mind that section 1 of the Constitution declares that South Africa 
is a democratic state founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms, purposive interpretation enables the court to 
look at the land reform provisions of section 25 in their historical contexts. The text of s 25(5) 
– (8) makes it clear that the final Constitution is devoted to achieving land reform by 
providing a constitutional framework that; redresses the wrongs of spatial apartheid through 
the restoration of land to people forcibly dispossessed; redistribution of land in order to 
provide those without land access to land so as to improve their economic well-being; and to 
provide those who do have access to land, but whose continued access is precarious because 
they do not enjoy rights in the land, with security of tenure.109 Land reform is envisaged by 
the Constitution to be relatively insulated from constitutional attack. The provisions that 
                                                          
105 A reading of the constitutional text in this manner finds support in the Post amble to the interim Constitution. 
106 Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 390. 
107 AJ van der Walt (note 1) at 258; S v Makwayane (note 103). 
108 Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 390. 
109 Department of Land Affairs, South African Land Policy (note 84) at Chapter 2.  
27 
 
specifically insulate land reform from constitutional attack are section 25(4)(a) (“the public 
interest includes the nations commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about 
equitable access’’) and section 25(8) (“ no provision of this section may impede the state 
from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order 
to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the 
previous section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1)’’).This insulation is 
necessary in order to ensure that the structuring of land reform programmes and the 
mandating of the enactment of statutes, remain undeterred by political and legal culture 
influence.  
  The realisation of land reform hinges on more than the installation of a land reform 
framework that develops programmes capable of readdressing the wrongs of the spatial 
apartheid land law system. Its realisation requires the adoption of the Constitution’s clearly 
articulated vision of land reform, as expressed in section 25 (5), 25(6), 25(7) and 25(8), in 
order to co-ordinate the linking of the three land reform projects as they each relate to broader 
land redistribution reform, poverty alleviation and development. 110 This, it is argued, is the 
substantive aspect of the land reform provisions in section 25 which constitutionally mandate 
transformation and development through the advancement of social justice.  
   The text of the section 25, more specifically the major portions dealing with land reform, 
carefully guides the Constitutional Court in its interpretation and reading of the values and 
principles that lie at the core of the substantive aspects of the property clause. The inclusion 
of the substantive aspects of land reform as enshrined in sections 25 (5) – (8) ensure that any 
interpretation of the property clause should be done holistically, taking into account the 
values and principles which mandate the insulation of land reform from constitutional attack. 
The text lends further normative weight to the purposive interpretations of the property clause 
as sympathetic to the advancement of land reform.111 In referring to the constitutional text, 
the historical context in which the Constitution was drafted and the Constitution itself the 
Court becomes empowered to adopt a purposive interpretation that enables it to construe 
private property rights in such a way so as to not impair the constitutional commitment to 
land reform as set out in section 25 (5) to 25(8).112 
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    I put forward the argument that whenever the court engages with purposive interpretation 
(that is the act of considering the underlying connections that exist between constitutional 
provisions, the Constitution and its historical context) the court better understands the essence 
of what the preamble to the Constitution characterised as ‘the Constitution playing a central 
role in the social and economic transformation of society’. In better understanding this role, I 
put forward the argument that the court becomes compelled to adopt the best constitutional 
interpretation that is capable of ensuring that the essence of what is characterised in the 
preamble of the Constitution is legitimated by the Court’s constitutional interpretation. 
   Having considered the relation between the foundational values in the Constitution and 
purposive interpretation, it is worth considering how purposive approach to the interpretation 
of individual rights conflicts with the ideals of social transformation 
5.1.2. A CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN A GENEROUS 
PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE 
IDEAL OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
 
   On numerous occasions the Court has had to deal sensitively with how it ought to treat the 
rights of individual private property holders, and the majority’s social rights to land. The 
earliest instances in which the Court insightfully dealt with the purposive approach to 
constitutional interpretation demonstrated its affinity towards considering rights as being 
constructed generously, and securing a full measure of protection for individuals.113 In the 
cases of Zuma114 and Makwanyane115 the court developed a two-stage approach to the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. The first stage entailed ‘a broad rather than a narrow 
interpretation to be given to the fundamental rights’ and, at the second stage, ‘limitations 
have to be justified through the application of section 33 of the interim Constitution’.116  
  The Court in Ferreira 117 once again dealt with rising tensions between individual rights and 
the collective social empowerment rights to social and economic reform. Ackermann J, 
writing only for himself, expressed that ‘a broad and generous interpretation of freedom does 
not deny or preclude the constitutionally valid, and indeed essential role of state intervention 
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in the economic as well as the civil and political spheres’.118 This laid the foundation for the 
collective view of the Court, that irrespective of whether or not the generous two stage 
analysis is followed in any given case, ‘individual rights should not be interpreted in such a 
way as to prevent the state from being an active agent of change’.119 Following from this 
thread of reasoning further, the Constitutional Court’s decisions had to approach the 
‘generous’ method of interpretation with more caution, especially in particular instances 
where the Court was forced to confront conflict between private individual rights and socio-
economic rights. 
   In Soobramoney120 the court, having been confronted with the claimant’s private individual 
right of section 27(3), had to confront the conflict that existed between this particular right 
and the collective social empowerment rights of section 27(1) and (2). The court considered 
cautiously its position in terms of whether the circumstances and the context permitted a 
broad and generous interpretation of the claimant’s right in his favour. The court, quoting O’ 
Reagan J in Makwanyane, reasoned that context may require that the court adopt a “narrower 
or specific meaning” in order to give effect to the purpose of the particular provision.121 In 
adopting this reasoning the court awakened itself to the possibility that a broad and generous 
interpretation of Soobramoney’s claim to section 27(3), may impact on the greater good of 
the constitutionally mandated redistribution of resources for everyone. The court in trying to 
manage and resolve the conflict that arises between individual and collective social 
empowerment rights, considered that the context and the purpose of a particular provision 
may dictate that individual rights will have to be construed narrower. This is to ensure that 
these individual rights do not remain as obstacles, giving way for the state to take suitable 
steps towards realising the constitutionally mandated redistribution of resources. It is at this 
point that the court established precedence for the constitutionality of a reading requiring 
individual rights to give way to the greater project of economic and social redistribution.122 
   In the case of the land reform measures it is likely that the state will encounter a conflict 
between the rights of existing property holders (section 25(1), (2) and (3)), and the collective 
social empowerment rights of the landless (section 25(5) to 25(8)). I put forward the 
argument that the state ought to adopt a holistic construction of section 25 that encapsulates 
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the ideas of the property clause representing a ‘property and land rights’ clause, inclusive of 
rights of existing property holders and the collective social empowerment rights of the 
landless. The state, it is argued, ought to follow the court’s lead in Soobramoney, and follow 
a reading of the property clause that is cognisant of the constitutionality of individual rights 
giving way to the greater projects of social and economic redistribution of resources.123 I put 
forward the argument that this reading is consistent and in keeping with the Constitution’s 
underlying ethos of transformation, social justice and development. 
  
5.1.3 PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP 
OF SOCIO- ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
   Following from the discussion of the Constitutional Court’s use of purposive interpretation 
to further the Constitution’s underlying transformative agenda, the apparent fluidity at which 
the court is able to integrate its interpretation of a particular right with other socio economic 
rights is useful in keeping a holistic understanding of the Constitution, as a ‘unitary’ and 
‘purposeful document’ that envisions the establishment of a new society premised on  socio-
economic transformation, social justice and development’.124 The Court has in some 
instances construed section 25 together with other socioeconomic rights protected in the Bill 
of Rights, such as section 26 the right to housing and section 27 the right to food, water and 
health care.125 In a couple of cases the Constitutional Court had to interpret meaningfully 
specific rights in the Bill of Rights for the purposes of determining how those rights were to 
be enforced by the state. It was in these cases where the relevant socioeconomic right with 
which a particular fundamental right could be associated with, was considered together by the 
Court.126  
    The Court has often viewed different socio-economic rights as complementing and giving 
meaning to one another in regards to the attainment of socio-economic reform. In 
Grootboom127 the court examined the interrelationship between section 25 and section 26, 
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and construed them as mutually supporting the imperative of socio economic reform.128 This 
was exhibited when the court considered its interpretation of section 25(5) as complementing 
and giving meaning to a similarly worded provision in section 26 (2).129 Upon reflection of 
section 25(5), the court construed section 26(2) to mean:  
“the state is obliged to achieve the intended result of the constitutional directive in s 26. The 
legislative measures will invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well directed 
policies and programmes that must be reasonable in both their conception and their 
implementation. The formulation of a programme is only the first stage in meeting the state’s 
obligation. The programme must also be reasonably implemented. An otherwise reasonable 
programme that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state’s 
obligations.”130  
   Both section 25 (5) and section 26 (2) mutually support the constitutional directive imposed 
upon the state to initiate socio-economic reform, and to support such reform through 
reasonable legislation, policies and programmes.131 Both provisions as understood by the 
court also articulate an obligation to formulate legislation, policies and programmes that 
reasonably carry out the type of reconstruction of the land holdings and housing dilemmas 
that section 25(5) and section 26(2) envision.132 Both provisions arguably articulate an 
obligation placed on the state to constantly assess and engage with its reform policies, in 
order to enable it to effectively verify whether such reform policies and programmes remain 
reasonably compliant with the entrenched constitutional directives of land reform and the 
right to housing.  
   The inextricable link between section 25(5) and section 26(2) arguably lend to my 
argument that the state is constitutionally empowered to strategically develop effective 
policies and programmes that provide access to land and housing on an equitable basis. The 
desired effect of the transformation of existing land holdings in order to advance the notion of 
equitable access will not materialise, if state policies and programmes have the effect of 
unreasonably excluding a significant segment of the African society. This is supported by the 
dicta in Grootboom which held that in the context of section 26(2), a programme that 
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excludes a significant segment of the African society cannot be said to be reasonable.133 Due 
to the similarity in wording between section 26(2) and section 25(5), the application of this 
line of reasoning to the interpretation of section 25(5) opens up interesting possibilities that 
are worth mentioning. 
   Consider for example an instance where the state had constructed policies which upon 
implementation had negative consequences for the rural poor. In June 2000 the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs announced that it had reconstructed its redistribution policy, in 
order to achieve a different objective.134 Commentators of the policy implemented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land affairs, stated that the reconstruction of the redistribution 
policy shifted its focus away from the rural poor and had the effect of unreasonably excluding 
a significant segment of the society (the rural poor) from gaining equitable access to land.135 
The reconstructed policy contemplated that some funding, previously set aside for the 
development of the rural poor, would be redirected to the segment of society that was more 
economically advanced.136  
    In light of the Constitutional Court’s approach to construing section 26(2) as 
complementing and giving meaning to section 25(5), I put forward the argument that such a 
shift in the development and implementation of a new policy may be considered as 
unreasonable, and could be understood as a violation of the state’s obligations in section 
25(5).137 
   I am however aware of the challenge presented by the separation of powers, and the 
Constitutional Court’s position on deference. According to Budlender at the very least, the 
legislature and the executive could be compelled to enact and implement legislation and 
policy that is consistent with the constitution’s underlying objectives of socio-economic 
reform, as entrenched in section 25(5), (6), (7) and (8).138However, once the legislation is 
enacted and the policies implemented Budlender argues that the legislature and the executive 
enjoy constitutional protection against challenge due to the court’s stance on deference.139 
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   However, Grootboom arguably provides an avenue in which this challenge could be 
overcome through the court’s adoption of the principle of ‘reasonableness’. Policies and 
legislation that may on the face of it appear to be reasonably enacted and developed can still 
be attacked, if implementation of the same policies and legislation are characterised as 
‘unreasonable’. Arguably this will enable land reform beneficiaries to challenge the state on 
the basis that the work being done, does not go far enough in achieving the objectives of 
transformation, social justice and development in the context of land reform. 
   In today’s circumstances the state is encumbered with issues surrounding equitable access 
to land and access to adequate housing. A significant segment of society cannot seem to 
access these rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Despite these prevailing issues the 
socio-economic right to land coupled with the right to housing, call upon the state to commit 
to constructing programmes and policies that do not have the effect of excluding a significant 
segment of the African society from equitable access.  The state must be aware of the manner 
in which it implements these policies and programmes. How the state chooses to implement 
its policies and programmes on land reform and access to housing will have a direct impact 
on its ability to comply with its constitutional obligations, and achieve the intended results of 
section 25 (5) and section 26 (2) respectively. 
   The court in Grootboom established a synergy between the socio-economic right to land 
and the socio-economic right to housing. This synergy lends to the socio-economic right to 
land being of special urgency within the Constitution’s textual design as a whole.140 In light 
of Grootboom the court arguably explicitly linked the right to housing in the urban context to 
the constitutional imperative of land reform and land restructuring.141 By adopting and 
implementing policies such as expropriation and land redistribution that fervently enforce and 
promote access to equitable land, the right to access to housing inadvertently becomes 
promoted and enforced. The concomitant result is the development of socio-economic viable 
solutions that address issues of poverty as a result of lack of access to land, and severe 
housing shortages.  
   The concerns for addressing severe housing shortages, poverty alleviation in rural and 
urban areas and access to equitable land for the landless segment of society, are to be found 
in the fundamental rights of section 25(5), (6), (7), (8) and section 26(1) and (2). In order to 
address the issues of severe housing shortages and immense poverty in both urban and rural 
                                                          




areas, the court ought to consider property rights and the socio-economic right to land 
contained in section 25 in light of a purposive method of interpretation.142 This will enable 
the court to extrapolate clear and concise constitutional directives which once articulated, 
sufficiently direct the state as to how it ought to give effect to its duties to promote and fulfil 
its obligation to land reform. 
   Having considered the tensions that arise between a generous purposive approach to the 
interpretation of individual land rights and the socioeconomic right to land within the 
property clause, a discussion will now follow on how the state, since the adoption of the final 
Constitution, has attempted to deal with the tensions that arise from the limitation of property 
rights, and the advancement of the socioeconomic right to land as secured by land reform 
provisions.    
5.2.  DISCUSSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY POST 1996, DEALING 
WITH THE PARAMETERS OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AS OUTLINED IN SECTION 25 vs THE LIMITATION OF THOSE 
RIGHTS IN RELATION TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF LAND REFORM 
PROJECTS THROUGH POLICIES OF EXPROPRIATION AND LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION. 
5.2.1 HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE PROPERTY CLAUSE: PROPERTY AND 
MEASURES THAT ADVANCE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHT TO LAND 
   When the final Constitution came into effect in 1996, it made provision for a 
‘property and land rights clause’ that no only secured existing property holdings against 
improper state interference, but also made explicit provision for land reform, including 
provision for regulatory deprivation and for the expropriation of property for the sake of land 
reform.143 In First National Bank when unpacking section 25 the court expressed its holistic 
view of section 25 as not only concerning itself about property rights, but also concerning 
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itself with land rights. Section 25 was inherently designed to not only oversee the protection 
of property rights from unreasonable interference by either private parties or the state, but it 
was also designed in part to oversee and guide the constitutionally mandated attempt to 
reconstruct society through social and economic land reform measures.144 
When construing section 25 holistically the court further elaborated that property 
rights enshrined in section 25(1), (2) and (3) ‘must not be construed so as to be enforced in 
isolation, but in the context of ss (4) to (9) and their historical context’.145 Section 25(1), (2) 
and (3) must further be construed in the context of the Constitution as a unitary document that 
aims to transform the enduring legacies of apartheid, in order to achieve a democracy 
founded on the principles of equality, freedom and dignity. 
  The constitutional drafters of subsections (4) to (9) intended to insert these provisions 
in order to emphasise that under the final Constitution, the protection of property as an 
individual right was not to be an absolute right but a right that was to be justifiably limited by 
societal considerations such as the public interest.146 Subsections (4) to (9) articulate the 
Constitution’s underlying transformative agenda for the need and aim of the Constitution to 
redress one of the most enduring legacies of racial discrimination in the past, namely the 
grossly unequal distribution of land in South Africa.147 I submit that this is to be 
constructively addressed through a progressive land reform programme that expropriates 
land, and redistributes it in order to address the remnants of the grossly unequal distribution 
patterns of land. 
Upon reflecting the court’s approach to understanding section 25 holistically in First 
National Bank, I submit that section 25 outlines how the process of mediation between 
individual and societal interests in the distribution of land and property is to occur within the 
context of transformation and social justice. It is clear from how the court construes the 
individual protections afforded by subsections (1) to (3), that in light of the historical context 
of subsections (4) to (9)148 the state ought to progressively engage with its constitutional 
mandate to arrange land reform programmes that serve and protect the public interest. In 
effect the constitutional interpretation of the property clause by the court in First National 
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Bank arguably acknowledges that section 25 is pro transformation, in that it entrenches and 
mandates government to give effect to land reform measures that serve the broad public 
interest and not the interests of the unilateral protection of individual property rights. 
5.2.2 STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 25: SECTION 25 (1) TO 
(3) “THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY” AND SECTION 25 (4) TO (9) “THE 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHT TO LAND”  
The court in First National Bank laid out its structural approach to section 25 which for the 
purposes of the thesis is worth considering whenever section 25 is constitutionally analysed. 
When a challenge under section 25 for the infringement of property rights arises, the section 
that is implicated is section 25 (1).149 This is the starting point for constitutional analysis.150 
Any form of deprivation must abide by terms of laws of general application, and ought not to 
be arbitrary to the extent that the deprivation is not procedurally unfair or does not provide 
sufficient reason for the particular deprivation.151 Expropriation for the purposes of advancing 
land reform would be considered as a form of deprivation according to the wording of section 
25(1). 
 Expropriation led reform measures that are conducted according to fair procedures and 
which are authorized by ‘laws of general application’, will pass muster without having to 
undergo a section 36 limitations analysis.152 This was confirmed by the court’s reading of 
section 25(1) in First National Bank whereby it decided that instances where a deprivation 
meets the criteria in section 25(1), no subsequent section 36 analysis is required thereafter.153 
Following from meeting the criteria in section 25(1), ‘the deprivation (expropriation) must 
then undergo a section 25(2) analysis which entails the consideration by the court of whether 
the deprivation can be seen as an expropriation that does not serve a public purpose or a 
public interest.154 Should the court be satisfied that the deprivation (expropriation) does not 
amount to one that is not for a public purpose nor in the public interest, the inquiry then 
proceeds to section 25(2) and (3).155 
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Expropriation led reform is bolstered by the protection afforded by section 25(2)(a) read with 
section 25(3), 25(4)(a) and s 25(8) when it is considered as furthering the societal interests of 
the broad public, and furthering the Constitution’s commitment to land reform as a means of 
providing large marginalised sections of society with equitable access to land. It is submitted 
that the ‘public interest requirement’, echoed in these respective provisions, will be met 
accordingly when the state progressively undertakes to implement expropriation as its 
primary policy for the purposes of land redistribution. 
5.2.3 EVALUATION AND COMMENTARY ON SECTION 25 (1) AND (2) 
VERSUS THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS TO LAND IN SECTION 
25(4) TO (9) 
 
In evaluating the textual structure of section 25, the constitutional entrenchment of 
existing property rights seems to be counterbalanced by the socio-economic right to land. 
This reading of the text suggests that whilst the property clause acknowledges the protection 
afforded to existing property rights, such protection does not apply unilaterally and cannot 
subvert the constitutional entrenchment and enforcement of the socio-economic rights to 
land. I would like to emphasise that this line of reasoning is supported by Budlender et al who 
argued that an interpretation of section 25(8) reveals that in a limitations analysis, section 
25(8) will play the role of ensuring that land reform is characterised as a ‘specially valued 
and protected purpose of the Constitution’.156  
It is argued that when the property clause was originally negotiated and agreed upon 
during the transitional negotiations, the amalgamation of property rights and the socio-
economic right to land into one provision ensured that neither individual property rights nor 
the socio-economic right to land were considered as the ‘primary right’ entrenched in section 
25. However, for the purposes of analysis, it is presumed that the state has adopted a different 
textual reading of section 25 whereby the existing property rights are considered to be the 
primary rights that are entrenched in section 25. This presumption finds support in a 
discussion by Budlender et al in which the authors address the type of compensation formula 
adopted by the state in the Expropriation Act.157 
  In their discussion, they provide an example of what they perceive to be a tendency on 
the part of the state, to treat property rights as the primary right entrenched in section 25. The 
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example provided is the compensation formula adopted in the Expropriation Act.158 
Budlender et al opine that the current compensation formula contained in the Expropriation 
Act establishes compensation at or above market value.159 They argue that the Act’s 
compensation formula is inconsistent with the constitutional formula which is open to 
compensation being granted below market value, if such compensation can be determined as 
being ‘just and equitable’. 
Noting that the current Expropriation Act of 1975 generally provides for 
compensation at or above market value, is indicative of government’s commitment to the 
demand driven and market based ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ principle to which 
government committed itself to in the 1997 white paper.160 Due to the state’s reluctance to 
progress an expropriation policy that critically engages with the Constitutional formula that is 
open to compensation being at below market value, interested parties will continue to expect 
compensation at market value or well above it. It is submitted that this state of affairs 
invariably attributes the slow pace at which reform through the state’s redistribution 
programme occurs. This does not represent the Constitution’s commitment towards the 
reconstruction of the current land holdings in order to enable equitable access to land for 
marginalised segments of society, whom the apartheid land law previously discriminated. 
According to Chaskalson and Lewis161 the Bill of Rights set minimum standards 
which the state is obligated to observe.162 The Constitution however grants allowances for the 
state to decide whether it is open to extend greater protection to rights, than is required by the 
Bill of Rights.163 It is submitted that for the purposes of analysis, it is presumed that the 
government’s adoption of a compensation formula in the Expropriation Act is indicative of 
its commitment to the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ principle. The adoption of this type of 
compensation formula arguably has the effect of the state extending greater protection to the 
property rights entrenched in section 25(1). Arguably the state does so because of its 
perception of the existing legal culture surrounding property law that is underscored by a 
belief, that compensation of an amount at market value or higher duly compensates a 
property owner as envisioned by section 25(1) and (2)(b). 
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Having regard to section 25(5), (6) and (7), the government developed three projects 
that were to encompass its broad land reform programme. These three projects were set out in 
the White Paper on South African Policy164 detailing the three projects as redistribution, 
tenure reform and restitution. The general function of section 25(5), (6) and (7) is to provide a 
constitutional framework and justification for these projects in order to ensure that legislation 
becomes promulgated. Promulgation of legislation linked to the broad land reform 
programmes will serve to give effect to the broad constitutional objectives of land reform, 
and restore legal protection to and commercial value of ‘black’ land rights. 
One of the land reform projects that encompass a component of the broad land reform 
programme is Land Restitution. Section 25(7) provides the constitutional framework and 
justification for the development of legislation and policies that pursue the objective of land 
restitution. The provision however does not provide a detailed outline as to how restitution is 
to be achieved. Section 25(7) intends to leave open the construction of restitution legislation 
and policy to the Legislature and the Executive accordingly. The legislature has been 
assigned the right by the Constitution to determine the content of the right to restitution, 
subject only to section 25(7). Because section 25(7) does not prescribe the exact nature and 
content of the rights to restitution, the actual transformation of existing land rights and the 
creation of new land rights are left to laws concerned with tenure reform and land 
redistribution.165 
The state implemented its programme of land restitution when it enacted the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act166 , which sought to determine how restitution was to be 
addressed and realised. The Act envisioned redress taking the form of the granting of 
alternate land or an award of final compensation, which was to be determined by either the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights or the Land Claims Court.167 The Act empowers 
the Commission to investigate claims and attempt to mediate and settle land disputes.168 
Should those disputes not be resolved, the Commission then refers the dispute to the Land 
Claims Court.169 Since the state promulgated the Restitution Act, the Act seemingly took 
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centre stage as the government’s main response to redressing the past apartheid land laws that 
preserved control and access to property on the basis of race.  
  Although the Act aims to break away from the hegemony of the ownership-oriented 
hierarchy of land rights, none of the provisions in the Act explicitly break away from the 
structural and dogmatic hegemony of the common-law hierarchy of land rights. It is 
interesting to point out that the provision of restitution of ‘property’ in section 25(7) is more 
expansive, as it could be interpreted to include restitution of real rights and personal rights to 
property. The Act however seems to interpret the restitution of ‘property’ as excluding 
personal rights to property. This is reflected in the Act’s inability to break away from the 
structural and dogmatic hegemony of the common-law hierarchy of land rights, despite the 
Constitution not explicitly prohibiting the extension of the restitution right to holders of 
personal rights to the ‘property’. Consequently, the timidity in which the Act reinforces the 
hegemony of the ownership-oriented hierarchy of real rights to land suggests that the 
Legislature is not restricted by the section 25(7) when defining the content of the right to 
restitution of ‘’property’, and how the right is given effect to. Arguably section 25(7) leaves 
enough room for the state to break away from the hegemony of awarding restitution on the 
basis of the ownership-oriented hierarchy of land rights, in order to develop progressive 
policies furthering land reform in this particular area.  
The second category of the broad land reform programme is the redistribution of land. 
This process deals with the redistribution of land to persons who have no land or who have 
had inadequate land as a result of entrenched apartheid land laws. The redistribution of land 
project embodies the constitutional directive in section 25(5) in terms of creating the 
constitutional framework that the state is to follow when developing policies regarding the 
allocation of funds for the development of land, and developing laws and implementing 
polices that promote wider access to land and housing.170 The redistribution project operates 
to extend the concept of individual ownership, to the people and communities previously 
excluded from it by centuries of colonialism and apartheid land law codes. The redistribution 
project acknowledges that there still exists an overall imbalance in the current land holdings, 
and consequently a stand-off between the (black) land less and the current government, in 
regards to a lack of transformation, still persists. The land redistribution project that is 
informed by land reform imperatives embedded in section 25(5) helps us understand that the 
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Constitution envisions a systematically transformed property law that is capable of being 
harnessed by the state. 171 Through the adoption of transformative land reform 
policies/measures the state is empowered by section 25(5) to facilitate access to land through 
redistribution. This in turn facilitates the economic growth and development that is necessary 
to alleviate poverty.  Section 25, bolstered by the inclusion of the land reform provisions, was 
constructed with the above objective in mind, and so I put forward the argument that it is 
unlikely that section 25 can be interpreted holistically as limiting land reform policies. 
The last category of the broad land reform programme outlined in section 25, is tenure 
reform. Historically tenure reform was intended to address the legal transformation of the 
apartheid land law system that rendered the land rights of the black population weak and 
unsuitable, into a more just land law system that secured and strengthened their rights.172 
Through section 25(6), the land reform programme of land tenure operates to restore security 
and permanence, reinforce the land rights of those neglected under the apartheid land law 
system and to formalize the land rights of those whose occupation and use of previously 
dispossessed property justified it.173 According to AJ van der Walt, land tenure reform is the 
most abstract of the other land reform projects represented in the Constitution. The 
underlying purpose behind this project is to alter and transform the laws that determine the 
legal form and nature of land rights, rather than the physical handing over of property to 
people as is envisioned by the land restitution and land redistribution projects.174 There lies a 
difficulty however in being able to identifiably measure success in terms of the manifestation 
of transformation, development and social justice. One argues that in order to accelerate the 
pace at which transformation of the current land holdings occurs so as to mirror the 
Constitution’s aspiration of transformation, development and social justice, a more robust and 
comprehensive programme centred on expropriation should be considered and implemented 
by the state. 
  These separate but interconnected projects have important consequences for the 
establishment of social justice, and the development of South Africa’s current property 
holdings and land rights regime.175 
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This thesis is concerned with the issue of expropriation for the purposes of achieving 
land reform through redistribution. The thesis is therefore focused on the rights conferred in 
section 25 (5) and their potential to meaningfully and permanently affect large scale 
redistribution of property in order to enable those previously discriminated under apartheid 
land law, access to and ownership of land. Tenure reform and restitution are therefore not the 
forums in which the thesis seeks to address the alteration of the distribution patterns of land. 
   Due to the explicit commitment in section 25(1) to protect the private rights of 
existing property holders, it is conceivable that the provisions mandating land reform would 
be subjected to constitutional attack from individual property holders who fear their rights are 
under threat. However it would appear that the constitutional text of section 25 affords a 
reading that the land reform provisions are capable of being insulated from constitutional 
attack.176 According to the interpretations of section 25 (8), Chaskalson and Lewis opined 
that ‘subsection (8) was seemingly included on the basis that the existing private property 
rights as protected in section 25(1), would not preclude the state from expropriating land and 
water for the purposes of redistribution on account of a possible limitation of section 
25(1)’.177 It is argued that this interpretation accords with the general emphasis in section 25 
(5) on the significance of land reform, and such emphasis arguably gives the land reform 
measures stronger protection against constitutional attack by entitling the justification of 
infringements to private property rights in pursuit of land reform, by the state.  
   Geoff Budlender offers another interpretation of the relevance of section 25(8) when he 
suggests that it is ‘plausible to read section 25(8) as signalling that measures in pursuit of 
“land, water and related reform” serve a “particularly valued purpose”, thereby justifying 
greater limitations on existing private property rights in the context of land redistribution, 
restitution and land tenure reform.178 It is argued that this interpretation offered by Budlender 
once again supports the argument that the constitutional significance of land reform, as 
outlined in the land reform provisions, suitably permits the obligatory limitation of the private 
property rights of existing property holders whenever the greater project of economic and 
social redistribution is taken up by the state. Since these land reform provisions are insulated 
from possible constitutional attack by section 25(4) (a) and section 25(8), the state is better 
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placed to actively pursue progressive and sustainable land reform measures as is directed by 
section 25 (5), (6) and (7). Failure to fulfil its obligations in terms of these provisions raises 
the concern of what reading the state adopts of section 25(1), (2) and (3), whether generous to 
existing property holders or generous to the landless?179 
   I acknowledge that tension may arise in terms of the most suitable interpretation of 
the property clause, having regard to the entrenchment of provisions protecting private 
property rights and explicit provisions mandating land reform. Critics of the government’s 
redistribution programme have attributed the slow pace of reform to the government’s 
continued commitment to the demand-driven, market-based ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ 
principle, which one argues is informed by its generous reading of section 25(1), (2) and (3) 
in favour of existing property holders.180  
 I put forward the argument that it is this preferred interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions, together with the prevailing legal culture that has condemned the use of 
expropriation as a last resort mechanism for the advancement of land reform. An 
interpretation of this nature would not be consistent with the values lying at the core of the 
Constitution that of; transformation and development through the social justice projects of 
economic and social redistribution. 
   However, how the Constitutional Court has attempted to resolve the foreseeable tensions 
that may arise between a suitable interpretation of individual property rights and a suitable 
interpretation of land reform provisions, by referring back to the Constitution’s core 
underlying values of transformation, social justice and development, bodes well for 
developing a jurisprudence that is consistent with the ‘minds of the drafters at the time that 
they drafted the Constitution’.181  
5.2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began with the discussion and analysis of the interpretation of section 25 
in light of the Constitutional Court’s purposive approach to interpretation. The meaning 
assigned to the purposive interpretation of section 25 by the Constitutional Court, 
demonstrated that section 25 mirrors the public law view of the Constitution as an instrument 
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for social change and transformation in the area of land reform. The text of section 25, more 
specifically the major portions dealing with land reform, have carefully guided the 
Constitutional Court in its interpretation and reading of the values and principles that lie at 
the core of the substantive aspects of the property clause.  
The chapter demonstrated that whenever the court engages in purposive interpretation 
of section 25 it does so holistically, thereby enabling the court to construe existing private 
property rights in such a way so as to not impair the state from giving effect to the land 
reform provisions outlined in section 25(5) to 25(8). Upon reflection of the court’s purposive 
interpretation of section 25(5) and section 26(2) in Grootboom, the chapter demonstrated that 
how the state interprets these provisions influences its choices in regards to how it 
implements policies and programmes on land reform and access to housing. This may well 
have a direct impact on the state’s ability to comply with its obligations outlined in section 25 
(5) and section 26(2) respectively. It is clear from how the Constitutional Court in First 
National Bank construed section 25(1) to (3), in light of the historical context of section 25(4) 
to (8), that section 25 is pro transformation in that it entrenches and mandates government to 
give effect to land reform measures (for example expropriation for the purposes of land 
redistribution) that serve the broad public interest, and not the interests of a unilateral 
protection of existing property rights. 
An ever-growing fixation with the progress of land reform and concerns that the state 
is increasingly hesitant to use its expropriation powers for land reform purposes, has cast the 
apparent conflict between the state’s duties to promote land reform (specifically equitable 
access to land, as provided for in section 25 (5) of the Constitution) and to pay just and 
equitable compensation for expropriation (section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution) into the 
spotlight. The state has come under fire for the lack of speedy land reform in the context of 
land redistribution, and this has been attributed by some to the state’s commitment to the 
willing-seller/willing buyer principle which has dissuaded the state from invoking its 
expropriation powers for the public interest. At this juncture, the issues of feasibility 
constraints and their effect upon the state to take reasonable measures in fostering conditions 
that enable equitable access to land will be discussed and critiqued in the final chapter. The 
thesis will then address the state’s hesitation to use its expropriation powers extensively for 
land reform purposes and its unwillingness to speed up land reform, by discussing whether 
the Constitution empowers the state to expropriate land against compensation at less than 
market value in order to remove any obstacles to meaningful and effective speedy land 
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reform. The underlining question to these two areas of concern is whether the state can 
reconcile its duties to promote land reform, with its obligations to pay ‘just and equitable’ 
compensation for expropriation. 
.                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 CONFLICT BETWEEN STATES OBLIGATIONS TO PROMOTE LAND 
REFORM v JUST AND EQUITABLE IN RELATION TO EXPROPRIATION 
LED REFORM 
 
6.1. FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINT CONCERNS RAISED BY THE STATE IN 
FULFILLMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION’S PROMISE TOWARDS LAND 
REFORM. 
 The issue of feasibility constraints upon the state’s ability to promote and fulfil its 
obligations in regards to section 25(5), affects the adoption of policies, programmes and 
legislation that meaningfully, effectively and speedily address land reform. The claims of 
feasibility constraints arise out of a concern for the availability of resources at the state’s 
disposal, which are necessary for realising the socio-economic right to land entrenched in 
section 25(5). The state has on a number of occasions responded to claims of failure on its 
part to realise socio-economic rights, by claiming that the realisation of a particular socio-
economic right was either too costly or not an immediate priority.182 Despite this, the 
Constitutional Court has handed down judgements in which it has addressed the issue of 
feasibility constraints.183 A number of principles have been extracted from a number of these 
cases, and these principles help provide a jurisprudential framework in which the problems of 
feasibility constraints are to be approached. 
 Feasibility constraints often limit the achievement of progressive policies and 
programmes (for example expropriation led land reform) designed to give effect to the socio-
economic rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. It is my contention that appeals to the 
infeasibility of the advancement of progressive policies and programmes designed to affect 
transformation of the status quo, must be challenged and interrogated. This is especially 
necessary in instances where claims of infeasibility seem to justify the conclusion that the 
status quo does not violate the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.184 The state’s plea of 
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the infeasibility of adopting a progressive policy of expropriation that meaningfully and 
permanently redistributes land, thus transforming the status quo, masks the lack of political 
will on its part to comply with section 25(5) due to its commitment to the willing-
seller/willing buyer principle. Although the courts have attempted to address the problems of 
appeals of infeasibility by the state, they have not yet developed a unified basis for 
approaching these types of pleas.185 
 Since the dawn of a constitutional democracy in 1994, the Constitutional Court has 
largely deferred from encroaching upon areas of governmental competence in regards to 
socio-economic policies.186 It has been cautious in its assessment of the concerns of the 
availability of resources at the state’s disposal, for the advancement of socio-economic 
policies centred on transformation, social justice and development. The Constitutional Court 
has however been prepared to scrutinise pleas of infeasibility sceptically, and enforce 
compliance with the constitutional obligations of provisions dealing with socio-economic 
rights.187 A number of principles that have been affirmed by the Constitutional Court in 
addressing claims of infeasibility assist in understanding the court’s approach towards the 
state, and its obligations to adhere to the Constitution’s desired transformative ambitions. 
 
6.1.1 PRINCIPLES EXTRACTED FROM THE CASES 
 
 One of the principles that the court encountered was the reality that limited resources 
impact on the fulfilment of socio economic rights by the state.188 It is in this context that the 
court has resolved to develop a ‘reasonableness’ assessment of the state’s constitutional 
obligations, in order to review whether the state has taken reasonable steps to adhere to the 
Constitution’s desired transformative ambitions.189 The reasonableness assessment, as was 
referred to and understood in Grootboom, is particularly helpful when assessing the steps 
taken by the state in fulfilment of obligations in s 25(5).190 It is argued that although the state 
may raise a plea of the infeasibility of adopting an extensive expropriation policy that is 
capable of fostering the necessary conditions for equitable access to land, the preferred 
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commitment to the expropriation of land based on the willing-seller/willing buyer principle 
could be determined as unreasonable.191 This is because the commitment to the willing-
seller/willing-buyer principle only seems to benefit the select rights of the individual property 
owners, as a result of the purchase or expropriation of the required amount of land at or above 
market value. This process invariably becomes too expensive, and given the limited state 
resources and the government’s range of other socio-economic obligations, effective and 
meaningful land reform could fail to materialise and address the socio-economic realities of a 
significant segment of society formally discriminated against. In effect, the socio-economic 
rights to land for a large marginalised segment of society could be hindered as a result of the 
government’s commitment to the demand driven, market based willing-seller/willing buyer 
principle.192  
 This follows onto the next principle that ‘any programme for the progressive 
realisation of a socio-economic right which fails to make appropriate resources available is 
unreasonable’.193 This dictum suggests that a challenge to a programme on the basis that it 
fails to make appropriate resources available is wholly permissible.194 The central question 
that the court considers when assessing reasonableness in the context of the positive duties 
imposed on the state, is whether the means chosen by the state are reasonably capable of 
facilitating the realisation of the right?195. Yacoob J held that ‘reasonableness’ requires, at the 
very least, a social programme that is comprehensive, balanced and flexible in design in order 
to give effect to a socio-economic right.196 Furthermore, Yacoob J held that the social 
programme must be reasonably conceived and implemented.197  
  Reflecting on this dictum requires one to question whether the state’s land 
redistribution policy has ‘reasonably’ facilitated the realisation of the socio-economic right to 
land entrenched in section 25(5)? I consider firstly whether the prevailing redistribution 
policy of government has been comprehensive in its land reform capacity? Due regard must 
be had of the government’s reluctance to exercise its powers of expropriation as its primary 
instrument in facilitating its redistribution programme, and not a mechanism of last resort.198  
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An argument could be advanced that the government’s redistribution policy could 
meet the ‘reasonableness’ criteria expressed in Grootboom if it were to adopt a flexible 
approach to expropriation that was open to compensation at a lower rate than market value, 
where consideration of the factors enumerated in section 25(3) indicated that such lower rates 
were just and equitable.199 This would ensure that an expropriation led redistribution policy 
would reflect an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected by the expropriation, by leaving open the possibility that the scales will be tipped in 
favour of either sets of interests when it was just and equitable to do so.200 Current practice 
however implies that market value is the predominant or determinative factor when 
calculating compensation for the purposes of expropriation.201 Arguably the current practice 
affects the state’s capacity to facilitate greater land reform in the area of redistribution, to the 
extent that it neglects the very delicate and carefully calibrated balance established in section 
25(3). A preoccupation with establishing market value first and then determining whether it 
should be reduced in view of other factors in section 25(3), may arguably tip the scales 
unfairly in favour of the interests of those affected by the expropriation rather than the public 
interests. Current practice suggests that the government’s redistribution programme lacks a 
reasonably comprehensive, balanced and flexible solution to the realisation of the socio-
economic right to land entrenched in section 25(5). 
The next principle that the court has explored in its assessment of the credibility of 
infeasibility claims is ‘all who are subject to duties in terms of the Bill of Rights must 
purposefully and creatively take all reasonable measures to ensure maximum possible 
compliance’.202 The court has been sceptical to accept complacency in the face of pleas of the 
scarcity of resources. In Jaipal203 , the Constitutional Court warned that creative solutions 
would be required to ensure compliance with the Constitution in conditions of scarce 
resources.204 An argument can be advanced to the extent that it would be creative and 
legitimate for the legislature to set down a general land reform discount for compensation in 
land reform expropriations, provided that such discount is based on the considerations of 
section 25(3).205 Such legislation, as is argued by Zimmerman and AJ van der Walt, is not 
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only creatively feasible but it is also desirable as a mechanism that can comprehensively 
speed up and facilitate land reform thereby giving effect to section 25(5).206 Such creativity 
on the part of the legislature and the government could ensure compliance with the 
Constitution’s transformative agenda in section 25(5) within conditions of scarce resources. 
  
6.1.2.  EXPROPRIATION: A MATTER OF BALANCING LAND REFORM 
INTERESTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF THOSE AFFECTED 
BY THE EXPROPRIATION 
 
The constitutional principle of compensation finds itself at the heart of the 
contestation between the development of an effective, speedy and meaningful programme of 
redistribution of land by way of expropriation on the one hand, and the protection of existing 
property rights through ‘just compensation’ on the other. It is my contention that this arises 
out of the incorporation of the concept of ‘market value’ and the ‘willing-seller/willing 
buyer’ principle into the Expropriation Act.207 It would appear that the principle forms the 
basis of the calculation of market value in cases dealing with expropriation.208 The resultant 
effect is that expropriations that are defined according to an award of compensation 
calculated at market value or above, as ‘just compensation’, may contribute to the 
unwillingness on the part of  government to advance programmes centred on section 25(5) 
because they may prove to be simply too expensive.209 It is my contention that where there is 
a shortage in resources and the state must manage its resources carefully, an interpretation of 
section 25 (3) that is linked to compensation at market value based on the ‘willing-
seller/willing buyer’ principle is unhelpful for the purposes of advancing expropriation led 
land reform. This will unfortunately result in the burden of infeasibility falling upon the 
landless. This is so because of the continued unqualified support of the constitutional 
protection of the existing property rights by government, through its commitment to the 
willing-seller/willing buyer principle in the 1997 White Paper on Land Policy and the 
Expropriation Act of 1975. The continued unqualified constitutional protection of existing 
property rights coupled with a ‘just compensation clause’ which is reinforced by the 
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government’s commitment to the willing-seller/willing buyer principle, will likely derail any 
reasonable attempt at achieving substantial redistribution of land. According to Budlender 
this will invariably result in the socio-economic right to land for the landless, entrenched in 
section 25(5), being undermined.210  
  Because of its constitutional importance, the issue of compensation must be carefully 
negotiated and dealt with in a constructive manner reflecting the flexibility at which 
compensation can be determined in accordance with values and principles enshrined in 
section 25(3). This will invariably impact on position to be taken by the government in terms 
of its formulation and implementation of progressive, meaningful and speedy measures for 
the advancement of land reform. 
 
6.1.3. DEFINING ‘JUST AND EQUITABLE’ FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
RECONCILING THE STATE’S DUTIES TO PROMOTE LAND REFORM 
ANDTO PAY JUST AND EQUITABLE COMPENSATION FOR 
EXPROPRIATION 
 
Section 25(3) stipulates that compensation should be determined in a just and 
equitable manner that is reflective of a carefully constructed equitable balance between the 
public interest, and the interests of those affected by the expropriation.211 In order to maintain 
this careful balance between the opposing interests the determination of compensation 
requires a flexible approach that is sensitive to the need for land reform to occur within 
budgetary constraints, whilst not unfairly jeopardizing the protection afforded to existing 
property rights.212 It is my contention that the language of section 25(3) in synergy with 
section 25(2) (b), section 25(4)(a), section 25(5) and section 25(8), suggests that the 
determination of compensation must be flexible in striking an equitable balance between the 
competing interests having particular regard for the historical context of the injustice of the 
apartheid land law system, as well as the guiding constitutional value system laden with 
principles of social justice and transformation.213    
                                                          
210 Ibid at 304. 
211 S 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
212 Jill Zimmerman (note 44) at 406. 
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When it comes to the calculation of compensation, section 25(3) makes provision for 
the determination of ‘just and equitable’ compensation according to a consideration of all the 
relevant circumstances outlined in subsections (a)-(e). The language of section 25(3) does not 
articulate nor indicate that market value is sufficient on its own to determine the necessity or 
amount of compensation.214 Section 25(3) instead articulates that all relevant circumstances 
outlined in subsections(a)-(e) should be considered together in determining when it would 
be just and equitable for the state to pay below the market value, specifically in instances 
where it seeks to expropriate land for the purposes of advancing its redistribution 
programmes.215 Section 25(3) arguably makes it clear that compensation at a lower rate than 
market value is constitutionally permissible, where a lower rate than market value is found to 
be ‘just and equitable’ and reflective of an equitable balance between the public interest and 
the interests of those affected by the expropriation.216 Such an interpretation invariably tries 
to reconcile the state’s duties to promote land reform, and its duty to pay just and equitable 
compensation especially in instances where the state is inclined to pursue measures that 
progressively, speedily and meaningfully advance land reform. 
  Considering the focus of section 25(3) on the importance of determining what is ‘just 
and equitable’ compensation as well as the need to maintain an equitable balance of the 
competing interests, it is argued that section 25(3) empowers the state, with sufficient 
flexibility, to adopt a compensation formula that is sensitive to the constitutional need of the 
advancement of expropriation led land reform within budgetary constraints.217 This may 
arguably present the government with the most effective means of reconciling its duties to 
promote land reform on the one hand, and its duty to pay just and equitable compensation on 
the other.   
  The constitutional reality of expropriation and compensation outlined in section 25(3) 
is contrastingly different from the government’s current approach to expropriation led land 
reform for the purposes of advancing land redistribution. In some areas of the Expropriation 
Act, for example, it is unclear how these provisions complement the Constitution in relation 
to the issue of expropriation and compensation.218 The Constitution’s position on 
expropriation and compensation seems to be different to the Expropriation Act’s position. 
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Section 25(3) sets the standard for constitutional compensation: ‘it must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected’, 
market value being one of the factors taken into account.219 This is different to the Act, which 
prescribes the calculation of compensation according to market value which is informed by 
the market based willing seller/willing buyer principle.220 
 This difference is manifested in how the Constitution firstly envisions the state to 
take reasonable legislative measures to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access 
to land on an equitable basis, and how the government actually perceives this duty.221 
Arguably the Constitution envisions the adoption of a flexible approach towards determining 
compensation against an expropriation based on what may be just and equitable in the 
instance. What may be just and equitable in some reasonable instances, is compensation at a 
lower rate than market value. This preferred outcome may reasonably assist the government 
in minimizing the expense and delay of formulating and implementing a meaningful, speedy 
and effective programme of redistribution of land by way of expropriation.  
Contrastingly, current practice suggests that the Expropriation Act envisions that 
market value still plays a large role in determining and quantifying compensation.222 This is 
clear from the current practice of first establishing market value and then determining 
whether market value should be reduced in view of the other factors in section 25(3).223  It is 
my contention that this may curtail the state from formulating and implementing a 
meaningful, speedy and effective programme of redistribution, due to a preoccupation with 
determining adequate compensation that the state believes adequately and fairly protects the 
interests of those affected by the expropriation. It is my contention that this has the potential 
to not reflect a just and equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected. It may also hinder the state in being able to reasonably reconcile its duties to 
promote land reform, and to pay just and equitable compensation. This will invariably have 
the effect of instilling reluctance on the part of government to earnestly pursue measures that 
meaningfully, speedily and effectively resolve the lack of transformation in the land holding 
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structures of South Africa. It is argued that it is this reality, that sums up the lack of 






The dissertation set out to investigate whether section 25 has hindered or imposed any 
constraints on the state to develop, and adopt progressive land reform policies focused on 
land redistribution.  This involved an assessment of the constitutional text and language of 
section 25 as well as the constitutional jurisprudence, in order to ascertain whether the 
property clause, as some critics of the constitution have expressed, can be considered as the 
reason for the conservative pace at which the state has approached its constitutional 
obligation of advancing land reform. The dissertation set out to demonstrate that section 25 is 
not ‘anti-transformation’, and that rather the state’s interpretation of section 25 as well as the 
prevailing legal culture have seemingly contributed towards the state premising its 
redistribution program on the willing seller-willing buyer policy, which has hindered the state 
from advancing speedy and meaningful land reform in the area of land redistribution.  
This chapter aims to outline the most important observations made in the preceding 
chapters, in order to provide for a progressive and transformative interpretation of section 25 
and its land reform provisions. 
The dissertation considered firstly the meaning of South Africa’s transformative 
constitutional agenda within the context of land reform. The dissertation established that 
South Africa’s transformative constitutional agenda is informed by the Constitution’s 
underlying desire to commit the state to transforming society, into one in which citizens have 
access to social and economic resources that ensure a realization their self-worth and dignity. 
The Constitution outlines an overriding and ever-present commitment towards realizing 
substantive (redistributive) equality and justice and not just formal equality and justice. In the 
context of land reform, the Constitution’s transformative agenda intends to overcome the 
socio-economic legacy of apartheid through the adoption of reasonable legislation that 
assures access to socio-economic welfare in the areas of access to land, which is to be 
facilitated through progressive land reform. South Africa’s transformative constitutional 
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agenda in the context of land reform, has been translated into the provisions of s 25(4) – (8) 
which articulate the constitution’s commitment towards achieving substantive (redistributive) 
equality through the implementation of reasonable laws, policies and programs designed to 
ameliorate the conditions of those previously dispossessed of their rights to property. 
A discussion of the influence of legal culture strongly highlighted how this has 
influenced the interpretation, the application and enforcement of section 25, and how section 
25 and its underlying values and principles influence the socio-economic development in the 
area of land reform. Despite the tendency of the current legal culture to revert to a 
conservative and formalistic approach to the constitutional interpretation, enactment and 
enforcement of section 25, the Constitution establishes the necessary normative institutional 
framework through which egalitarian socio-economic transformation is capable of being 
infused into the current legal culture. 
The dissertation then proceeded to consider the legislative history of the property 
rights prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and the impact that the constitution has had on 
property rights and land reform. The constitution, together with its property clause, is a 
product of intense negotiation between the apartheid government and the African National 
Congress. The constitution intrinsically embodies a compromise between the negotiating 
parties. None more so than in the case of the compromise reached between the apartheid 
government, and the African National Congress with regards to the property clause. 
Compromise is represented by the National Party securing existing rights in land, within 
section 25, through the right not to be deprived of such rights without market value 
compensation, and the African National Congress securing an inclusion of a provision for 
land reform within section 25. The compromise entailed drafting a clause which in essence 
protected existing rights in land, but also protected the advancement of land reform and the 
redistribution of land. What has emerged from the history of the intense negotiation around 
the issue of land is a property clause that contains an inherent tension between the protections 
of existing property rights on the one hand, and the constitutional commitment to the 
redistribution of property within the reasonable parameters of the constitution on the other.224 
Included in this is the adoption of expropriation of land as a mechanism for land reform 
purposes, provided compensation is made available.225 The second chapter of the dissertation 
established that despite a divergence of views of the ideal constructed version of the property 
                                                          




clause that is entrenched in the final constitution, it is commonly accepted that section 25 was 
constructed with the foresight that it would facilitate rather than frustrate land reform. The 
dissertation has demonstrated in chapter two that the constitution, particularly section 25, 
creates a sufficient framework in which government is capable of invoking its powers of 
expropriation to promote and facilitate effective land reform for the purposes of advancing 
the redistribution of land. 
The dissertation proceeds to outline the academic discourse surrounding the inquiry of 
whether the law, specifically section 25, has stood in the way of government in unfolding a 
program of land reform that is consistent with the objectives of section 25(5). The chapter 
considered the application of innovative and progressive ways of reading, interpreting and 
thinking about property, property rights and the constitutional protection of property in view 
of the constitutional obligation to promote land reform. The chapter sought to demonstrate 
that the critical examination of section 25 by influential academics in the area of the 
constitution and land has indicated that a progressive land redistribution policy can be 
implemented in a strategic manner if the state can observe the constitutional parameters in 
section 25(2) to 25(8).These constitutional provisions enable the state to overcome the 
challenge of protecting vested property interests, whilst at the same time broadening access to 
land through land reform. A discussion of the critical observations of the jurisprudence of 
section 25 by different academic experts highlighted that section 25 fundamentally provides 
guidelines (through section 25(2) and (3)) on how the state is to manage the tension between 
protecting vested property interests, and at the same time broadening access to land through 
land reform measures such as expropriation for the purposes of land redistribution. In 
formulating a comprehensive land reform policy, the government must overcome the 
challenge of broadening access to land to the most vulnerable and needy, whilst at the same 
time maintaining confidence in the land market. The chapter highlights how this challenge 
can overcome by the state in light of the language of subsections 25(2) and s 25(3), both on 
their own and in synergy with section 25(4)(a), section 25(5) and section 25(8). It was shown 
in the chapter that the textual synergy between these provisions could be construed as 
providing constitutional justification for the adoption of an expropriation policy, focused on 
providing for a substantial form of resource redistribution. 
The dissertation explained how the constitutional property clause is interpreted in 
light of the Constitutional Court’s First National Bank and Grootboom decisions. The 
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transformative Constitution brought with it a new interpretative framework that envisioned a 
construction of the property clause in a manner promoting the underlying transformative 
values of an open and democratic society. This new interpretative framework required the use 
of purposive interpretation as a means of promoting the underlying values entrenched in 
section 25. The chapter went onto discussing what purposive interpretation entailed in light of 
the Constitution’s commitment to fostering conditions which enable citizens to gain access to 
land, in order to create equal development opportunities for all. The discussion on the 
application of purposive interpretation by the Constitutional Court in the decisions of First 
National Bank and less so in Grootboom, raises the question of whether section 25 creates an 
interpretative framework in which the state is capable of invoking its powers of expropriation 
to promote and facilitate effective land reform for the purposes of advancing the 
redistribution of land.  This was answered in the affirmative, as the reasoning in First 
National Bank indicated that purposive interpretation of section 25 revealed that the clause 
(holistically) did indeed create a sufficient framework for government to invoke its powers of 
expropriation, in order to promote and facilitate effective land reform. In this regard one of 
the main criticisms leveled against the state in chapter four, is its failure to progressively 
unfold a programme of land reform as result of its misguided interpretation of section 25 as 
an obstacle to progressive land reform progress. The argument is that this misguided 
interpretation, which has been informed by a decision to adopt the willing seller-willing 
buyer policy, has contributed to the state’s inability to advance land reform policies that 
ensure that there is an equitable distribution of land. 
The dissertation goes onto to explaining that the substantive aspects of land reform as 
enshrined in section 25(4) – (8), lend further normative weight to the purposive 
interpretations of the property clause as sympathetic to the advancement of land reform. If the 
state follows the reasoning of the Constitutional Court regarding the interpretative framework 
of section 25, and adopts a purposive interpretation of the property clause as sympathetic to 
the advancement of land reform it will be able to construe the protection of existing property 
rights in such a way so as to not impair the constitutional commitment to land reform. 
Following from the reasoning of the court in First National Bank, section 25(1), (2) and (3) 
must not be construed so as to be enforced in isolation but having due regard to subsections 
(4) to (9). Subsections (4) to (9) articulate the Constitution’s underlying transformative 
agenda for the need and aim of the Constitution to redress one of the most enduring legacies 
of racial discrimination in the past, namely the grossly unequal distribution of land in South 
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Africa. The willing seller-willing buyer principle that the state seems to commit itself to in 
regards to its land reform policy, seems to fully protect the interests of existing land owners 
by neither compelling them to sell against their will nor at a price which they are not fully 
satisfied.226 This is despite the fact that the constitutional drafters of subsections (4) to (9) 
inserted these provisions to emphasise that the protection of an existing property right was 
not absolute, but a right that was to be justifiably limited by societal considerations such as 
the public interest.  The argument goes that the willing seller-willing buyer principle has the 
effect of favouring landowners, and essentially entrenches the consequences of the apartheid 
regime in a post-apartheid society.227  The dissertation thereafter questions whether such a 
policy can legitimately satisfy the need to protect existing rights to property on the one hand, 
and the constitutional commitment to ensure that meaningful and effective land reform 
measures realize equitable distribution of land. 
The last chapter of the dissertation sought to establish how feasibility constraint 
concerns have impacted the development and adoption of legislation, policies and programs 
that are capable of meaningfully, effectively and speedily addressing land reform. In the last 
chapter, the impact of feasibility constraints was assessed and it was shown how the state’s 
preoccupation with the willing seller-willing buyer policy (as the central part of its land 
reform policy), has made it difficult for the state to move away from the idea that fiscal 
constraints prevent the state from paying market value for compensation arising out of an 
expropriation. In essence the chapter highlights the short comings of the state’s failure to 
move away from the idea, that market value is central to the determination of compensation 
for expropriation.228 This only results in the reinforcement of the willing seller-willing buyer 
policy which not only hinders the state from using its available resources to adopt an 
interventionist approach to land reform (through the mechanism of state expropriation), but 
also provides extensive discretionary power to existing land owners who are empowered to 
influence the pace and direction in which land reform progresses.229 
It is argued that the state is empowered by the Constitution to adopt a more 
interventionist approach to land reform, through a state led expropriation policy for the 
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purposes of land redistribution. Section 25(2), section 25(3) and section 25(5) endorse this 
type of approach, especially where compensation is determined in a ‘just and equitable’ 
manner considerate of the need to ensure that existing property rights are not unfairly 
infringed whilst at the same time ensuring that protection of existing property rights does not 
hinder redistribution. It is therefore recommended that all institutions should be guided by 
such an approach, and adopt it in order to ensure the realisation of effective, speedy and 
meaningful land reform. 
 
7.1 WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
 
If the state overcomes its feasibility constraint concerns by judiciously developing and 
implementing a program of state expropriation as endorsed by section 25(2) and section 25(3) 
and section 25(5), the state will be able to expedite its land reform program and implement its 
land redistribution policy in such a way as to address the extreme inequality in land holding 
structures currently. The answer to the question posed of ‘where to from here?’, lies in the 
application of a generous and purposive interpretation of section 25 in order to give effect to 
speedy land reform. All institutions responsible for advancing transformative 
constitutionalism should be aware that the ideal interpretation to be given to section 25 seeks 
to advance land reform, and requires the state to move expeditiously in this regard. The 
answer to the question posed ‘where to from here?’ also lies in the abandonment of the 
willing seller-willing buyer principle as a vital consideration in the issue of compensation. 
The state is empowered to abandon this policy when invoking its powers to expropriate land 
for the purposes of land redistribution, because it is not required to determine compensation 
as a prerequisite for a valid expropriation.230 It has now been accepted by the highest court231 
that the state is empowered by section 25(2) and 25(3) to expropriate property even when the 
seller is refusing to accept a reasonable offer of compensation, as a result of the removal of 
the obstacle of determining compensation prior to expropriation. 
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